Washington University in St. Louis

Washington University Open Scholarship
Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and
Dissertations

Arts & Sciences

Spring 5-15-2017

Folk Epistemology of Factual, Political, and Religious Beliefs
John Christner
Washington University in St. Louis

Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds
Part of the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Christner, John, "Folk Epistemology of Factual, Political, and Religious Beliefs" (2017). Arts & Sciences
Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1096.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/1096

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts & Sciences at Washington University Open
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact
digital@wumail.wustl.edu.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS
Department of Psychology

Dissertation Examination Committee:
Leonard Green, Chair
Robert Kurzban
Alan Lambert
Lori Markson
Casey O'Callaghan

Folk Epistemology of Factual, Political, and Religious Beliefs
by
John Christner

A dissertation presented to
The Graduate School
of Washington University in
partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

May 2017
St. Louis, Missouri

© 2017, John Christner

Table of Contents
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. v
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. vi
Acknowledgments......................................................................................................................... vii
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ viii
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Goals of the Current Research .............................................................................................. 2
1.2 Philosophical Background and History of Folk Epistemology ............................................. 3
1.2.1 Epistemological Theories and Principles ........................................................................... 3
1.2.2 Psychological Research on Folk Epistemology ................................................................. 7
1.3 Why Are Religious and Political Beliefs Interesting? ........................................................ 18
1.4 Summary of Motivation for the Current Research .............................................................. 23
1.5 Outline of Studies ................................................................................................................ 23
1.6 A Note on the Sampling Technique Used in the Present Research .................................... 26
Chapter 2: Study 1 – Categorizing Statements ............................................................................. 27
2.1 Hypotheses .......................................................................................................................... 27
2.2 Method ................................................................................................................................ 27
2.2.1 Participants ....................................................................................................................... 27
2.2.2 Procedure and Measures .................................................................................................. 27
2.3 Results ................................................................................................................................. 29
2.4 Study 1 Discussion .............................................................................................................. 29
Chapter 3: Study 2 – Resolving Uncertainty ................................................................................ 31
3.1 Hypotheses .......................................................................................................................... 32
3.2 Method ................................................................................................................................ 32
3.2.1 Participants ....................................................................................................................... 32
3.2.2 Procedure and Measures .................................................................................................. 32
3.3 Results ................................................................................................................................. 34
3.4 Study 2 Discussion .............................................................................................................. 35
ii

Chapter 4: Study 3 – Verification ................................................................................................. 37
4.1 Hypotheses .......................................................................................................................... 38
4.2 Method ................................................................................................................................ 38
4.2.1 Participants ....................................................................................................................... 38
4.2.2 Procedure and Measures .................................................................................................. 38
4.3 Results ................................................................................................................................. 46
4.4 Study 3 Discussion .............................................................................................................. 48
Chapter 5: Study 4 – Falsification ................................................................................................ 50
5.1 Hypotheses .......................................................................................................................... 51
5.2 Method ................................................................................................................................ 51
5.2.1 Participants ....................................................................................................................... 51
5.2.2 Procedure and Measures .................................................................................................. 51
5.3 Results ................................................................................................................................. 53
5.4 Study 4 Discussion .............................................................................................................. 55
Chapter 6: Study 5 – Theories of Truth ........................................................................................ 58
6.1 Hypotheses .......................................................................................................................... 60
6.2 Method ................................................................................................................................ 61
6.2.1 Participants ....................................................................................................................... 61
6.2.2 Procedure and Measures .................................................................................................. 61
6.3 Results ................................................................................................................................. 65
6.4 Study 5 Discussion .............................................................................................................. 66
Chapter 7: Study 6 – Objectivity .................................................................................................. 70
7.1 Hypotheses .......................................................................................................................... 71
7.2 Method ................................................................................................................................ 72
7.2.1 Participants ....................................................................................................................... 72
7.2.2 Procedure and Measures .................................................................................................. 72
7.3 Results ................................................................................................................................. 74
7.4 Study 6 Discussion .............................................................................................................. 76
Chapter 8: Study 7 – Features of Uncertainty............................................................................... 78
iii

8.1 Hypotheses .......................................................................................................................... 80
8.2 Method ................................................................................................................................ 81
8.2.1 Participants ....................................................................................................................... 81
8.2.2 Procedure and Measures .................................................................................................. 81
8.3 Results ................................................................................................................................. 84
8.4 Study 7 Discussion .............................................................................................................. 86
Chapter 9: General Discussion...................................................................................................... 89
9.1 Summary of Purpose and Goals .......................................................................................... 89
9.2 Summary of Findings .......................................................................................................... 90
9.3 Implications ......................................................................................................................... 92
9.4 Caveats and Directions for Future Research ....................................................................... 95
References ..................................................................................................................................... 98
Appendix 1: List of Statements Used in Study 1 ........................................................................ 103
Appendix 2: List of statements used in Study 2. ........................................................................ 109
Appendix 3: List of Statements Used in Studies 3-7 .................................................................. 110
Appendix 4: New Indices of Religious Orientation (NIRO) ...................................................... 112
Appendix 5: Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA) .......................................................... 115
Appendix 6: Demographic Questionnaire .................................................................................. 118

iv

List of Figures
Figure 1: Example of a slider used in the studies…………………...………………………...…33
Figure 2: Diagram of the procedure for Studies 3-7……... ………...………………………...…41
Figure 3: Frequency of “yes” responses to verification question………………...…………...…47
Figure 4: Frequency of “yes” responses to falsification question…...………………………...…54
Figure 5: Responses to objectivity question………………………...………………………...…75
Figure 6: Frequencies of “believe” vs. “know” responses…...……...………………………...…86

v

List of Tables
Table 1:
Table 2:
Table 3:
Table 4:
Table 5:
Table 6:
Table 7:
Table 8:

Developmental stages of epistemological understanding ..........................................10
Correlations between mean certainty of truth and RWA and NIRO scores ...............35
Mean Difficulty (SE) to Resolve Uncertainty and Standard Error
According to Domain .................................................................................................35
Mean slider responses (SE) to Questions 2 and 3 ......................................................47
Mean slider responses (SE) to Questions 2 and 3 ......................................................54
Theories of truth/justification, mean slider responses, and p values from
ANOVA tests – Study 5 .............................................................................................66
Questions and results from ANOVA tests – Study 6 .................................................76
Questions, mean slider responses, and p values from ANOVA tests – Study 7 ........85

vi

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Leonard Green, Alan Lambert, Lori Markson, Robert Kurzban, Casey
O'Callaghan, and Peter DeScioli for their feedback and guidance.

John Christner
Washington University in St. Louis
May 2017

vii

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Folk Epistemology of Factual, Political, and Religious Beliefs
by
John Christner
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychological & Brain Sciences
Washington University in St. Louis, 2017
Professor Leonard Green, Chair
The term “folk” refers to the intuitive – as opposed to the academic – version of a
discipline (e.g., folk physics). The present series of seven studies explored folk epistemology,
that is, how laypeople intuitively think about their own knowledge. Concepts from academic
epistemology were investigated in laypeople. In addition, folk epistemology across three
domains of knowledge were compared: religious, political, and factual.
Studies consisted of two parts. In Part 1, participants were presented with religious,
political, and factual statements and asked how certain they were that each statement was true.
In Part 2, participants were re-presented with only statements that they had rated as very
certainly true in Part 1. For each statement presented in Part 2, participants were asked to reflect
on epistemological concepts related to how/why they believed the statement to be true. Studies 1
and 2 helped to validate the research materials. Studies 3 and 4 investigated the extent to which
laypeople use and value verification and falsification, respectively, across the three domains.
Study 5 examined theories of truth – do laypeople define the truth of religious, political, and
factual beliefs based on correspondence, coherence, or pragmatism? Study 6 explored
objectivity – do laypeople feel their beliefs are objectively true? Study 7 explored several
viii

concepts related to overall certainty and nature of belief, including the required effort to believe,
frequency of doubt, and obviousness and reasonableness of truth. Participants also were asked
how they would react to those who disagreed with them and to counterarguments as another
window into the nature of their beliefs.
Results showed that (i) folk epistemology differed systematically across the three
domains; (ii) intuitions about factual knowledge were more closely related to normative,
academic standards; and (iii) intuitions about religious and political knowledge were strikingly
different from normative standards. That is to say, religious and political beliefs were regarded as
less verifiable, less falsifiable, less consistent with other true propositions, more dubious, less
reasonable, and more subjective.
These results suggest that current conceptions of why/how people believe propositions to
be “true” insufficiently describe belief in the political and religious domains. Truth
determination is neither domain-general, nor does it rely exclusively on propositional content.
Laypeople appear to be less certain that religious and political propositions accurately track
reality. Exactly which factors motivate belief in these domains is still not fully understood.

ix

Chapter 1: Introduction
How do people think about the nature of truth, knowledge, and belief? For centuries,
questions about the acquisition and definition of knowledge were of concern only to
philosophers (Dancy, 1985). Epistemology (the academic discipline) explores many aspects of
human knowledge – how we justify our beliefs, define truth, and acquire knowledge (Honderich,
2005). It is the task of philosophers to establish normative standards and principles with which to
conceptualize knowledge. Recently, however, behavioral scientists have approached the
investigation of knowledge in another way, focusing not on the normative project of academic
epistemology, but rather on describing “folk epistemology” – intuitive theories and principles
that laypeople actually use when thinking about their own knowledge. This area of research may
be referred to as personal epistemology, folk epistemology, or simply epistemics (“folk
epistemology” will be used henceforth).
Folk epistemology is of interest to psychologists because it relates to many aspects of
human life – how we make decisions, form beliefs, learn, and commit to various propositions.
Major questions in the field revolve around how laypeople evaluate different sources of
knowledge. For example, are some people to be more believed than others, and why (Hofer &
Pintrich, 1997)? Is knowledge considered absolute or relative (Goodwin & Darley, 2008)? That
is, can different people’s perspectives be both true and contradictory at the same time? Other
questions pertain to the issue of how people justify their knowledge. For example, is the
subjective feeling of “certainty” the result of analytic reasoning, or is the feeling of certainty
generated by relatively heuristic processes (Buehl, Alexander, & Murphy, 2002)? Important
1

questions arise, too, over developmental issues. For example, at what age do children’s attitudes
about truth and certainty change (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000)? Finally, differences in
folk epistemology may depend on the particular domain of knowledge being considered. For
example, do people have a subjective sense that the facts learned about math and science are
more “objectively true” than is the case for social studies (Hofer, 2000)? Answering questions
like these helps us to understand how children learn, why conflicts over certain propositions
persist while others easily resolve, the nuances of the intuitive definition of “true,” and much
more.

1.1 Goals of the Current Research
The purposes of the present series of studies are twofold: firstly, to investigate theories
and principles from academic epistemology in laypeople. To what extent do laypeople rely on
the same ideas that philosophers use when they think intuitively about their own knowledge? In
order to answer this question, I present participants with straightforward, factual propositions –
that is, statements that refer to observable states of the world – and ask them to reflect on how
and why they believe these propositions to be true. More specifically, I ask if they rely on
various ideas from epistemology that have not yet been explored in laypeople (e.g., verification,
falsification, theories of truth, etc.).
The second purpose is to investigate hypothesized folk epistemological differences in two
previously underexplored domains of knowledge, specifically, the religious and the political. In
order to create a comparison to straightforward factual knowledge, I also ask people about
religious and political propositions that they believe to be true. As will be discussed in greater
detail below, the folk epistemology of religious and political propositions is fascinating for three
2

reasons: (i) previous research on intuitions about knowledge in these domains is sparse; (ii) many
propositions in these domains violate principles from normative epistemology; and (iii) belief in
these domains is accompanied by social costs and benefits, thereby creating a unique
motivational landscape with respect to belief.
In sum, the current research examines normative epistemological concepts as well as
other interesting ideas related to intuitions about knowledge in laypeople. Many of these
concepts have not yet been investigated. In order to explore “default,” or most common folk
epistemology, participants are asked about factual beliefs. In addition, the current research
simultaneously searches for domain specific, folk epistemological differences by asking
participants about religious and political beliefs.

1.2 Philosophical Background and History of Folk Epistemology
Before considering the rationale and design of the present studies in more detail, it is
important to provide a brief overview of the relevant philosophical terminology and a tour of
previous research in folk epistemology. These discussions provide a better understanding of
concepts that will be examined in the present studies and popular methodological approaches and
topics of interest in the field.

1.2.1 Epistemological Theories and Principles
The present set of studies asks laypeople about principles/theories from philosophy.
These ideas relate primarily to justification (the process of determining what is true) and truth
(the nature, or defining characteristics of being true). What follows is a brief review of those
concepts from philosophy that are relevant to the current research.
3

Justification
Which ideas from academic epistemology do laypeople intuitively use, if any, when
justifying their beliefs? Is intuitive justification different for “fact-based” beliefs compared to
religious beliefs? In philosophy, the major theory of justification is evidentialism, which, simply
put, states that justification of a conclusion depends on the evidence for it. In cases where
evidence does not exist, then the conclusion or belief is deemed unjustified, untrue, and cannot
be “known.” As Hume put it, “A wise man. . . proportions his belief to the evidence” (Hume &
Beauchamp, 2000, p. 56). Evidentialism has been supported by many influential philosophers
and remains the dominant theory of justification today.
An opposing theory of justification is fideism. Fideism is “exclusive or basic reliance
upon faith alone, accompanied by a consequent disparagement of reason and utilized especially
in the pursuit of philosophical or religious truth” (Plantinga, 1983, p. 87). Fideism is invoked
primarily in the philosophy of religion. Ideas supporting fideism date back as far as earliest
thinkers in the Catholic church, but the term was not coined until the 19th century (Amesbury,
2016).
Evidentialism is the sole theory of justification in modern science and is considered
normative in epistemology. Two influential ideas born out of philosophy that remain standard in
the scientific approach to achieving justification through evidence are verification and
falsification. Grounded in the empiricist tradition, the logical positivist movement of the 1920s
originally argued that for a statement to be even cognitively meaningful (and therefore true or
knowable), it must be verifiable (Ayer, 2012). Later, Karl Popper argued that falsification was
more useful for testing hypotheses about truth. According to Popper, the strongest hypothesis
4

must posit some observable state of the world that could prove it to be false, thereby enabling it
to be tested. If researchers attempt but fail to falsify a hypothesis, then it is believed to be more
true (Popper, 2005).
Theories of Truth
When considering their own beliefs, do laypeople define truth like philosophers do? Does
the intuitive definition of truth change across domains of knowledge (religious, factual,
political)? Whereas justification describes a process for arriving at truth, truth itself is a
description of the nature of a proposition. Three major theories of truth, in order of popularity,
are the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories (Kirkham, 1992).
Correspondence. Correspondence theory states that a proposition is true to the extent that
it corresponds to a state of the world. Any reliance on reality as a source for substantiating facts
could be said to fall under correspondence theory. This approach to defining truth dates back to
Aristotle, but influential thinkers like Bertrand Russell have supported and discussed the theory
more formally (Russell & Eames, 1984). An example of correspondence would be the statement,
“Koalas are in Australia.” The statement is true because the state of the world is such that koalas
are in Australia. The state of the world is not true or false itself, rather, it simply is. If the
proposition corresponds to that state of the world, then the proposition is true. Correspondence
theory works well for propositions that are linked to observable or at least theoretically
detectable states of the world. Critics complain that the theory is circular or vacuous because in
order to determine if a statement corresponds to a state of the world accurately, the state of the
world would need be determined in the first place. Thus, there would need to be some
ontological theory already in place that would accomplish any function purportedly derived from
5

correspondence theory (Williams, 1999). Despite these criticisms, correspondence theory
remains dominant among philosophers for defining the nature of truth.
Coherence. The most influential competing theory of truth to correspondence is
coherence theory. Coherence theory states that propositions are true to the extent that they cohere
with other established propositions, forming a mutually corroborating system of beliefs like a
web. This theory is often attributed to the scholars in the idealism school of thought which
construes reality as mentally constructed rather than existing independent of the mind (Walker,
1989). Because of this metaphysical position, idealists like Kant found coherence more
compelling than correspondence, which refers to an external reality. Coherence theory often
provides support for truth alongside correspondence because beliefs that cohere with one another
may fit together as part of a theory that ultimately rests on correspondence with the world (e.g.,
physical evidence that fits together to convict a murder suspect). But coherence theory is
uniquely well-suited to explain instances of truth in which correspondence can be unclear, such
as in the case of mathematical proofs.
Pragmatic. The pragmatic theory of truth, often attributed to William James, rejects the
idea that truth depends on principles like correspondence or coherence. Instead, truth arises from
how well a proposition functions for some purpose relative to its alternatives (Kirkham, 1992).
The pragmatic theory is sometimes used to understand the provisional truth of scientific claims
that function to explain phenomena and are always vulnerable to substitution for a betterfunctioning explanation. The present research explores the possibility that among laypeople, the
pragmatic theory may be used for ethical or religious truths that lack both correspondence and
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coherence, but are believed to function well for the good of society (e.g., “The world would be a
better place if everyone believed in God”).
Summary of Epistemological Concepts
Evidentialism is the prominent theory of justification whereby a proposition is considered
justified insofar as there is evidence for it. Under evidentialism, verification and falsification
remain popular tools for navigating evidence to confirm or disconfirm hypotheses. Fideism is the
idea that truth can be directly known through faith and does not require justification. It is often
used in religious contexts.
Three theories of truth prominent among philosophers are relevant to the present series of
studies. Correspondence refers to a relationship between a statement and the world. According to
correspondence theory, a statement is true when it accurately describes a state of the world.
Coherence refers to the relationship between true statements. According to coherence theory, a
statement is true when it is consistent with other true statements. Pragmatic refers to the
functionality of a statement for a given purpose. According to pragmatic theory, a statement is
true when its consequences are most useful for accomplishing a goal.

1.2.2 Psychological Research on Folk Epistemology
Although the present research does not involve children or developmental issues, much
of the previous research in folk epistemology has been conducted by developmental
psychologists. In addition, developmental psychologists generated many of the early questions
and theories that organized the field of folk epistemology. What follows is a brief review of the
historical roots and foundational contributions that remain relevant today. This review is meant
to familiarize the reader with the field of folk epistemology, popular methods, and types of
7

questions scholars have pursued previously – all of which are relevant to the present set of
studies.
Jean Piaget was one of the earliest scientists to study folk epistemology. His theory,
called “genetic epistemology,” set out to understand the origins and development of human
knowledge. According to Piaget, humans pass through four developmental stages: sensorimotor
(0-2 years old), preoperational (3-7 years old), concrete operations (8-11 years old), and formal
operations (12 and beyond). Each stage signifies a progression in intelligence and reasoning
abilities from mere motor skills to complex thought about abstract concepts and deductive
reasoning (Piaget, 1950).
Piaget’s approach motivated developmental psychologists to become pioneers in the
study of folk epistemology. Many followed his view by theorizing about the development of
epistemological features as a progression of stages. Kohlberg’s classic studies on the
development of morality investigated how children justify their knowledge and reason about
moral judgments throughout six stages (Kohlberg, 1971, 1976, 1981). Perry (1970) posited
stages of epistemological growth, focusing on adolescence into college years, in which young
people shifted from an absolutist to a more relativist understanding of truth.
Over the years, much of the developmental psychological theorizing and research fell
under the umbrella term “personal epistemology” (for reviews of various theories of personal
epistemology, see Hofer, 2001; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). As personal epistemology evolved as a
field, scholars sought to standardize terminology and unify related ideas about developmental
stages into a common framework. Kuhn et al. (2000) offered a unification of existing stage
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theories and investigated the source of knowledge, the subjectivity of knowledge, and how
intuitions vary across domains.
Kuhn et al. (2000) asked 5th, 8th, and 12th graders, and adults to evaluate disagreements
between “Robin” and “Chris” by reading statements about what Robin versus Chris believed. For
example, Robin believed one mathematician's proof of a math formula whereas Chris believed a
second mathematician's proof of the same math formula. Participants evaluated disagreements in
several different domains of knowledge including social facts, physical facts, personal tastes, and
social conventions. After being told about each disagreement, participants were asked if only one
person could be right or if both people could be at least partially correct. If the participant
responded that both people could be right, then a follow-up question was asked: “Can one view
be more right?”
Kuhn et al. (2000) interpreted an answer that only one view could be right as “absolutist”
whereas a response that both views could have some rightness was labeled “multiplist.” If the
participant thought one view could have more merit, they then were labeled “evaluativist” (see
Table 1, which displays a summary of Kuhn’s theory). Although there was a large variety in the
patterns of responses, Kuhn et al. interpreted the results as showing a progression through the
stages from absolutist to multiplist to evaluativist. This pattern was consistent across different
domains of knowledge like tastes, facts, and social conventions.

9

Table 1
Developmental stages of epistemological understanding (cf. Kuhn et al. 2000)
Stage
Assertions
Reality
Knowledge
Critical thinking
Realist
Assertions are COPIES of Reality is
Knowledge comes Critical thinking is
an external reality.
directly
from an external
unnecessary.
knowable.
source and is certain.

Absolutist

Assertions are FACTS
Reality is
that are correct or incorrect directly
in their representation of knowable.
reality (possibility of false
belief).

Knowledge comes Critical thinking is a vehicle
from an external
for comparing assertions to
source and is certain. reality and determining their
truth or falsehood.

Multiplist

Assertions are OPINIONS Reality is not
freely
directly
chosen by and
knowable.
accountable only to their
owners.

Knowledge is
Critical thinking is
generated by human irrelevant.
minds and is
uncertain.

Evaluativist

Assertions are
Reality is not
JUDGMENTS that can be directly
evaluated and compared knowable.
according to criteria of
argument and evidence.

Knowledge is
generated by human
minds and is
uncertain.

Critical thinking is valued as
a vehicle that promotes sound
assertions and enhances
understanding.

Summary of Developmental Psychological Contributions
The research questions, methods, and Kuhn et al.’s (2000) stage theory all exemplify the
foundational contributions to folk epistemology research from developmental psychologists and
personal epistemology. The source of knowledge, certainty, structure, objectivity, and domain
generality versus specificity all became topics of continued exploration. Asking people to
evaluate assertions, beliefs, and disagreements became frequently used methods of accessing
intuitions about knowledge. The present research borrows from several of these contributions,
but focuses on previously understudied domains of knowledge in adult participants.
10

The Domain Specificity/Generality Debate
One question first raised by developmental psychologists that remains relevant today is
whether folk epistemology is domain specific or general – that is, are laypeople’s intuitions
about knowledge different depending on the domain of knowledge? Early on, many scholars
interested primarily in human development focused on stages and patterns of folk
epistemological changes that occurred reliably over the lifespan at certain ages. These thinkers
parsed differences in folk epistemology according to stage rather than domain. However,
evidence for domain specificity has accumulated.
Hofer (2000) administered questionnaires to first-year undergraduate psychology
students. Participants were asked to respond on a scale from 1-5, indicating the extent to which
they agreed with statements designed to investigate four aspects of folk epistemology: certainty
of knowledge, simplicity of knowledge, source of knowledge, and justification for knowing. For
example, statements included, ‘‘In this field, today’s facts may be tomorrow’s fiction;” “In this
field, the only thing uncertain is uncertainty itself;” and “In this field, most words have one clear
meaning’’(Hofer, 2000, p. 388). One questionnaire was labeled “Psychology” at the top while
another was labeled “Science” (which referred to “hard sciences”). Results showed four major
differences between folk epistemology in psychology versus science. Participants responded that
scientific knowledge was more certain, attainable, and derived from authority than psychological
knowledge. However, personal experience was said to be a greater source of justification in
psychology. Hofer concluded that discipline-focused epistemological beliefs existed.
Buehl et al. (2002) also used questionnaires administered to undergraduates, and
compared students’ folk epistemology with respect to history versus math. Students were asked
11

to rate the extent to which they agreed with statements like, “Ideas in math/history are related to
each other,” or ‘‘History/math is unrelated to day-to-day life.’’ Buehl et al. found that students
viewed mathematical knowledge as more difficult to attain and more integrated with other
knowledge.
Wainryb, Shaw, Langley, Cottam, and Lewis (2004) used imaginary disagreements as a
way to elicit children’s (ages 5, 7, and 9) beliefs about subjectivity and justification of
knowledge and tolerance of opposing viewpoints. Four domains were studied: Morality (‘‘It is
okay to hit and kick others’’), facts (‘‘Rain is dry’’), tastes (‘‘Chocolate ice cream tastes yucky’’)
and ambiguous facts (“The dog isn’t eating because it isn’t hungry’’). Ninety-six participants, 32
at each age level, were first asked if they agreed with the statement and then were told about two
imaginary characters who held opposing viewpoints (one character held the same belief as the
participant and one held the opposing belief). Participants were then asked about subjectivity (is
it possible for both characters to be right or only one?) and tolerance (is it acceptable for
someone to have an opposing viewpoint to yours?). If the participant said “no” to the tolerance
question then justification was tested (why is it not acceptable for someone to have an opposing
viewpoint to yours?).
Participants responded to the subjectivity and tolerance questions with a “yes/no”
response and to the justification question by explaining their reasons as to why it was
unacceptable for others to hold opposing beliefs. For the justification question, the researchers
coded participants’ responses for statements like, “I don’t agree with this person because her
belief would cause harm/isn’t true/is subjective/isn’t fair/is incomplete.” Results showed that
children became slightly more subjective and tolerant with age. But the much stronger effect was
12

from domain. Fewer than 10% of children were subjective or tolerant of opposing moral or
factual beliefs whereas over 50% of children were subjective and tolerant of opposing beliefs in
the ambiguous fact and taste domains. These findings supported the argument for domain
specificity.
Responses about justification also were domain specific. Almost 100% of participants
referred to concerns about welfare and fairness when explaining why opposing moral beliefs
were unacceptable (‘‘Kicking other kids is mean because it hurts them, so what that kid said is
just wrong, very wrong’’). In the factual domain nearly 100% discussed concerns about what
was observably true (‘‘If she goed outside she’d see that rain is always wet, so her belief is all
wrong’’). Tastes were most frequently said to be subjective (‘‘People have their own tastes, so
both beliefs are right actually”) and children most often expressed concern at the difficulty of
verifying ambiguous facts (‘‘It’s not like we can ask the dog if he’s hungry, so maybe this kid is
right and the other kid is right too’’).
A Close Examination of the Goodwin and Darley (2008) Paradigm
Research on adults also has shown domain specificity. As will become apparent, the
present work was inspired, in large part, by a general methodological approach taken by
Goodwin and Darley (2008). The primary goal of that research was to assess whether
participants felt their belief was subjective/relative as opposed to objective/absolute across
different domains. It is thus useful to consider their methodology and results in some detail.
Goodwin and Darley (2008) examined laypeople’s intuitions about objectivity with
respect to four content domains. One domain pertained to factual beliefs (e.g., Boston [MA] is
further north than Los Angeles [CA]). A second domain pertained to moral precepts (e.g.,
13

robbing a bank in order to pay for an expensive holiday is a morally bad action). A third domain
pertained to social conventions (e.g., Wearing pajamas and a bath robe to a seminar meeting is
wrong behavior), and a fourth pertained to personal tastes (e.g., Frank Sinatra was a better singer
than is Michael Bolton). The study was divided into two stages.
Stage 1: In the first stage, participants rated the extent to which they personally agreed
with various propositions in the different domains on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 6 (strongly agree). For each statement, after rating their agreement level, participants also
categorized the statement as true, false, or opinion.
Stage 2: In Stage 2, participants were presented with two ethical, one factual, one social
convention, and one personal taste statement from Stage 1. Critically, in Stage 2, participants
were presented only with statements from Stage 1 with which they had highly agreed or
disagreed. That is, participants were presented with statements that they had rated either 1 or 2
(indicating strong disagreement) or that they had rated either 5 or 6 (indicating strong
agreement). For each statement that was presented in Stage 2, participants were (i) told that
someone else in the study had disagreed with them about the statement and, based on this
supposition, the participants were (ii) asked to select an option that best represented how they felt
about that disagreement. Participants were given four choices to characterize how they felt about
this disagreement: (1) The other person is surely mistaken; (2) It is possible that neither you nor
the other person is mistaken, (3) It could be that you are mistaken, and the other person is
correct or (4) Other.
Some clarification and elaboration on the aforementioned scales is worth noting here.
Choices 1 and 2 capture whether participants feel the truth of the statement is objective versus
14

subjective. Choice 1 was meant to capture objectivity. If a participant thought that anyone who
disagreed with them was surely mistaken, then that participant must have believed that their own,
exclusive understanding of the truth was absolute. However, choice 2 was meant to capture
subjectivity. If a participant thought that it was possible that neither party was mistaken, then
they must have thought that different versions of the truth were acceptable, or that truth was
relative. Choice 3 also was meant to capture objectivity. If the truth is objective, then that means
only one version can be correct. In the event that the participant was mistaken, that would mean
that the disagreeing other would have to be correct. Choice 4 was meant to capture all other
subjective cases where it is possible for someone to disagree, and yet neither party be mistaken.
Goodwin and Darley (2008) then created a measure of objectivity by combining the
responses to the categorization question in Stage 1 with the responses to the
subjectivity/objectivity question in Stage 2. This measure of objectivity had three levels: fully
objective, intermediately objective, and least objective. The most objective response, termed
“fully objective,” was defined as when the participant considered a particular statement true (or
false) in Stage 1 and considered one who disagreed as surely mistaken in Stage 2. Fully objective
was scored as a 3. “Intermediately objective” could result from a participant considering a
particular statement true (or false) in Stage 1 but not seeing either party as surely mistaken in the
case of disagreement in Stage 2. Alternatively, intermediately objective could result from a
participant considering a statement to be an opinion in Stage 1, but feeling that anyone who
disagreed was surely mistaken in Stage 2. Intermediately objective was scored as a 2. Finally, the
least objective was defined as when a participant considered a statement to be an opinion in
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Stage 1, and then didn’t regard anyone as surely mistaken in the case of a disagreement in Stage
2. Least objective was scored as a 1.
For example, suppose that a participant categorized the statement, “Frank Sinatra is a
better singer than Michael Bolton” as true/false in Stage 1, and then indicated that the
disagreeing other was “surely mistaken” in Stage 2. These responses, taken together, would
represent a “fully objective” belief and be scored a 3. If another participant categorized the
statement as true/false in Stage 1, but allowed for the possibility that the disagreeing other was
not mistaken in Stage 2, then these responses would represent an “intermediately objective”
belief and be scored a 2. If a participant categorized the statement as an opinion in Stage 1 and
then allowed for the possibility that the disagreeing other was not mistaken in Stage 2, then these
responses would represent the “least objective” belief, and be scored a 1.
Goodwin and Darley (2008) predicted that across factual, ethical, social convention, and
taste statements, they would see a trend from most objective to least objective responses. Based
on results using the three-point scale, their prediction was confirmed. Mean objectivity ratings
were 2.91, 2.56, 2.00, and 1.56 for factual, ethical, social convention, and taste statements,
respectively. ANOVA results confirmed a highly significant difference among all domain
comparisons. Later, in a similar follow-up study, Goodwin and Darley (2012) showed that
beliefs about negatively valenced moral acts (stealing a wallet) are seen as even more objective
than beliefs about positively valenced acts (donating income). In addition, Goodwin and Darley
(2012) asked participants to report the percentage of the population that they thought would
agree with each statement. The reported level of expected agreement predicted objectivity ratings
among participants. In other words, when participants predicted that most or all members of the
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population would agree about a statement, they were more likely to feel that the particular
statement was objectively true.
Goodwin and Darley (2008) inspired the methodology used in the current set of studies.
Similarly, the present set of studies seeks to describe people’s understanding of features of their
own knowledge, with a focus on religious and political versus factual beliefs. Like Goodwin and
Darley, I first ask participants what they believe, but critically, follow up with questions about
the nature of those beliefs.
Summary of Domain Specificity Debate
The historical roots in developmental psychology focused folk epistemological research
on domain-general developmental trends. Patterns of folk epistemological development
undeniably exist, but domain-specific aspects cannot be ignored. Muis, Bendixen, and Haerle
(2006) conducted a review of 19 studies revolving around folk epistemology. The studies
included within- and between-participant designs, and tested children and adults. Furthermore,
the studies looked at a wide range of epistemological concepts, including the structure of
knowledge, certainty of knowledge, sources of knowledge, and justifications for knowing. Muis
et al. (2006) found that 17 of the 19 studies provided clear support for domain specificity. The
remaining two showed moderate support for a domain-general model.
Evidence for domain specificity in folk epistemology is clear, but the field still needs
theoretical cohesion with respect to which domains of knowledge are of interest, and why. Some
researchers are interested in different academic disciplines, hoping to inform the educational
process, whereas others follow early theorists in parsing knowledge into moral beliefs, facts, and
social conventions. Amidst the conversation surrounding domain specificity in folk
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epistemology, one area of knowledge has been (perhaps surprisingly) underexplored, namely
ideological beliefs. Religious belief has long occupied a unique niche in philosophical history,
yet few psychologists have examined how laypeople think about their own religious knowledge.
Similarly, the folk epistemology of political beliefs has not been directly studied.
General Summary of the Background Literature
Folk epistemology is a field founded and formulated by developmental psychologists.
These early thinkers developed methods and areas of interest that remain prominent today. The
present research follows their lead by continuing to investigate the sources of knowledge,
justification, certainty, objectivity of knowledge, tolerance of disagreement, and domain-specific
intuitions about knowledge. Despite decades of research in folk epistemology, several major
ideas from academic epistemology remain untested in laypeople. Theories of truth and
justification have not yet been fully examined. The present research asks to what extent
laypeople use these ideas when thinking about their own knowledge. Evidence for domain
specificity in folk epistemology has been found in many previous studies, but understanding
which domain differences are most interesting, and why they exist, remains an open project.
Investigating two domains that have fascinating folk epistemological differences is a major goal
of the present research. It is with this goal in mind that I consider why religious and political
beliefs are of interest.

1.3 Why Are Religious and Political Beliefs Interesting?
Several factors motivated the study of folk epistemology of religious and political beliefs.
In addition to being historically underexplored, these domains embody fascinating and
mysterious epistemological features, making them ideal candidates for investigation. For
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example, many religious beliefs violate normative epistemological standards. That is, religious
beliefs often are unverifiable, unfalsifiable, not based on evidence, and may not correspond to
any state of the world or cohere with other propositions that the believer has determined to be
true. Our intuitive epistemological standards also are violated by religious propositions.
According to Boyer (2001), religious beliefs are by definition counterintuitive in the sense that
they violate our folk ontological systems for understanding the world. Consider a belief that a
spirit can walk through a solid wall. This proposition violates our folk physics which tells us that
normally, objects cannot move through one another. In this sense, religious beliefs are
automatically represented as strange and fantastic, even to those who believe them to be true.
Another interesting feature is that religious propositions are often considered to be
obviously false by all, except those who believe them. For example, some Appalachian churches
in the United States believe that bites from venomous snakes are harmless to believers (Hood &
Williamson, 2008). This belief is demonstrably false, evidenced by the hospitalization and even
death of snakebite victims. How do believers intuitively think about the truth of a proposition
that is so obviously false to everyone else? Even large, organized traditions make claims that
non-believers unhesitatingly find to be totally unconvincing. Put another way, we are all atheists
with respect to every god except our own (Dawkins, 2016). How are religious propositions
obviously false to some and simultaneously true to others?
Political beliefs are similar in some ways to religious beliefs in that they do not rely on
normative epistemological standards of justification and truth. For instance, political groups have
established platforms of beliefs without theoretical connections from one belief to the next
(lacking coherence). Believers may support theoretically conflicting positions, for example,
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being “pro-life” when it comes to abortions, and simultaneously in favor of the death penalty
(Kahan, 1999).
Significantly, the believer’s group membership in a politically relevant group predicts
belief more than the content of the proposition. For example, Cohen (2003) asked Republican
and Democrat participants how they felt about welfare. Cohen found that Democrats favored a
relatively “generous” version of this policy compared to Republicans. That is, Democrats tended
to support awarding recipients more money compared to Republicans. Participants then were
assigned to one of four conditions in which they read about a proposed welfare policy. Cohen
varied the amount of benefits recipients would receive, namely $800 (“generous”) versus $200
(“stringent”) per month. Cohen also varied whether participants were told that Republicans or
Democrats supported the policy. Results showed that participants overwhelmingly supported the
policies that their own political group approved of, independent of whether the policy was
generous or stringent. In a follow-up experiment, participants were even shown the proposed
policies side by side with information that Republicans/Democrats supported the
generous/stringent policy, respectively. Even when all information about both possible policies
was available, participants still preferred the policy that their group supported. In addition, when
asked, participants reported that their group affiliation did not influence their decision
whatsoever, and that their determination was based purely on an impartial consideration of the
facts. Interestingly, participants were certain that the group affiliation did influence decisions
made by their political opponents. In particular, Democrats denied that partisanship played a role
in their own judgments, even while asserting that such bias played a role in the judgments made
by Republicans, and Republican participants showed the mirror image of this effect. In short,
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participants believed that their own judgments were unbiased, but that judgments made by others
were biased. These findings demonstrate both the departure from normative epistemological
standards of justification and the significance of group affiliation in forming political beliefs.
When considering other political issues such as gun control or affirmative action,
therefore, these findings suggest that people will be biased in terms of how they process
arguments and evidence. Opposing arguments are subjected to extreme skepticism whereas
supporting arguments are accepted with little scrutiny. When people are allowed to choose how
to direct their own time and attention, they do not attempt to falsify their political beliefs and
instead focus on seeking confirmatory evidence (Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009; Taber &
Lodge, 2006). The departure from unbiased evidentialism in evaluating political policies
suggests the possibility of fascinating underlying folk epistemology in the political domain.
In addition to religious and political beliefs not adhering to epistemological principles,
these beliefs also influence a variety of social consequences including friendships, mating
opportunities, social status, political leadership, and intergroup conflict. In turn, these effects
mean that even if the contents of the religious or political propositions do not impact the world
(e.g., doing a rain dance may not actually cause rain), there are nevertheless real costs and
benefits associated with belief/disbelief (e.g., believing that a rain dance causes rain may have an
impact on social bonding). Conversely, other domains have no social consequences. For
example, people are not concerned about others’ beliefs about the viscosity of water or the
wavelength of light. This difference in social consequences, between religious and political
beliefs on the one hand and factual beliefs on the other, motivates the comparison of folk
epistemology across these domains.
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Examples of the social consequences of religious and political beliefs can be seen all
around us, but they have also been found in the laboratory. Members of religious groups and
political parties disproportionately behave altruistically toward one another and harmfully toward
outgroups. Bulbulia and Mahoney (2008) found that in a modified Dictator Game, Christian
dictators gave more benefits to Christian compared to non-Christian recipients. Moreover, in a
key condition, recipients were given the opportunity to incur a cost in order to reduce the payoff
to other participants in the experiment. Christian recipients who chose to incur a cost in order to
reduce the payoff to non-Christians were rewarded the most by Christian dictators.
People show a preference to not associate with members of outgroup religious traditions
(Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003). The world over, religion motivates intergroup conflict, and
battles are sometimes fought over the most minor religious disagreements (Harris, 2005).
Religious and political affiliations also influence people’s mating markets; they determine who is
a potential mate, and what courting and mating behaviors are acceptable (Kurzban, Dukes, &
Weeden, 2010; Li, Cohen, Weeden, & Kenrick, 2010).
For better or for worse, political and religious belief is used to determine coalition
affiliation and to make assumptions about the believer. In one of the few folk epistemological
studies looking at ideological beliefs, 8- to 10-year-old participants were asked to consider four
types of belief statements: true facts, religious beliefs, untrue facts, and opinions. The
participants were asked if the belief statement revealed more information about the world in
general or about the believer. Religious beliefs, opinions, and untrue facts were said to offer
more information about the believer whereas true factual beliefs revealed more about the world
(Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris, & Banaji, 2014).
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1.4 Summary of Motivation for the Current Research
The study of folk epistemology has illuminated several features of human intuitions about
knowledge, but several academic epistemological concepts remain unexplored in laypeople. The
current research aims to determine the extent to which laypeople think about or rely on these
concepts when forming their own beliefs. The folk epistemology of religious and political beliefs
has also been underexplored. These domains are particularly fascinating because of a number of
features suggestive of unique folk epistemology. These beliefs depart from normative
epistemological standards, are obviously false to many, are the result of biased reasoning
processes, and influence social consequences. All of these reasons motivate the investigation of
academic and other epistemological concepts, comparing the religious and political domains to
the factual domain.

1.5 Outline of Studies
In a series of seven studies, the current research aims to answer several questions, all of
which revolve around the folk epistemology of beliefs within three domains: religious, political,
and factual. In order to investigate the questions of interest, all of the studies asked participants
to reflect on statements that they believed to be true. There were three types of statements:
religious (e.g., Jesus walked on water without sinking), political (e.g., A powerful military is
necessary to protect American interests), and factual (e.g., A square has four right angles). The
major goals are to examine academic epistemological principles in laypeople and to explore
whether domain-specific differences exist in the folk epistemology of religious and political
versus factual beliefs. Below, I briefly summarize the questions and goals of each study to
provide an outline of the research. Specific hypotheses, methods, results, and conclusions,
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however, are explained later. It is important to keep in mind that the first two investigations,
Studies 1 and 2, represent “table-setting” studies, intended to provide the foundation for the
remaining five studies.
Study 1
The goal of the first study was to show that participants could reliably sort the target
statements into one of three categories (i.e., “religious,” “political,” and “factual”). This goal was
important, in order to verify that each of the statements clearly conveyed its intended meaning
and implication with respect to the three categories in question.
Study 2
Study 2 had two goals. The first goal was to validate the statements that would be used in
Studies 3-7. In order to ensure that religious and political statements had the intended meaning to
participants, it was important to demonstrate a correlation between belief that these statements
were true and accepted measures of religiosity and political orientation. Study 2 also explored
how people think about resolving uncertainty. Is uncertainty more difficult to resolve in the
political and religious domains than in the factual domain?
Study 3
Study 3 explored the epistemological concept of verification. Do people think their
religious, political, and factual beliefs are verifiable? Do they think evidence and verification are
the best ways to establish truth? The goal of Study 3 was to investigate how laypeople rely on
verification when determining truth across different domains.
Study 4
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Study 4 explored the epistemological concept of falsification. Do people think their
religious, political, and factual beliefs are falsifiable? Do they think evidence and falsification
are the best ways to establish truth? The goal of Study 4 was to investigate how laypeople rely on
falsification when determining truth across different domains.
Study 5
Study 5 explored academic theories of truth in laypeople. In particular, the goal of Study
5 was to investigate how laypeople use academic conceptions of truth and justification, and also
to demonstrate differences across domains of knowledge. Study 5 included questions like: When
considering why religious, political, and factual beliefs are true, which theory of truth do people
rely on – correspondence, coherence, or pragmatic? To what extent do people rely on trust in the
testimony of others or faith? How important is indoctrination from a young age for forming
beliefs in the religious, political, and factual domains?
Study 6
Study 6 explored the concept of objectivity and tolerance for opposing beliefs in others.
The primary goals were to investigate the extent to which people feel their beliefs are objectively
versus subjectively true, and to determine if there are differences across domains. Study 6 also
explored how people tolerate disagreement.
Study 7
Study 7 looked beyond academic concepts and explored various intuitions about
knowledge related to truth and certainty. The goal of Study 7 was to evaluate whether religious
and political beliefs violate not only academic standards but also intuitive standards of truth and
justification. Study 7 explored several aspects of certainty and belief, including how much effort
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is required to believe, how obvious and reasonable propositions are, if people doubt their beliefs,
and about the distinction between “knowing” versus “believing.” Furthermore, Study 7 examined
people’s reactions to counterarguments across the three domains.

1.6 A Note on the Sampling Technique Used in the Present Research
Participants for all studies were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk.com), a website where businesses or individuals, known as “requesters,” can post tasks
for individuals, known as “workers,” to complete in exchange for money. The tasks, referred to
as “Human Intelligence Tasks” (HITs), require human intelligence because equivalent machine
intelligence is either unavailable or too costly to develop. For example, a typical HIT might
involve determining whether photographs for a proposed catalogue are inappropriate – trivially
easy for most humans but currently impossible for machines.
MTurk has become a popular site to hire workers to complete surveys and social science
experiments. Participants voluntarily select a HIT and complete it from their own computer.
Several studies have compared the quality of data obtained through MTurk, in-person
questionnaires, experiments completed on computer at a lab, and face-to-face interviews.
Consistently, findings have shown that data from MTurk workers are relatively indistinguishable
or even superior to that obtained from American undergraduates (Buhrmester, Kwang, &
Gosling, 2011; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). In addition, MTurk workers tend to be older,
more ethnically and socioeconomically diverse, and have more work experience. MTurk is an
established and reliable tool for social scientists to gather data (Behrend, Sharek, Meade, &
Wiebe, 2011; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013).
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Chapter 2: Study 1 – Categorizing Statements
The overall goal of Study 1 was to verify that people consistently categorize statements
as factual, religious, or political, and to generate ten statements within each domain to be used in
Studies 2-7. Previous research on folk epistemology has often used statements from different
domains like moral judgment, social convention, personal taste, factual, religious, etc. (Goodwin
& Darley, 2008; Heiphetz et al., 2014). In the previous research, however, no procedure was
used to ensure that laypeople intuit the domain of the statements as intended by the researchers.
Study 1 was designed to do just that.

2.1 Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1A: Overall, many of the statements will be reliably categorized (enough to
proceed with Studies 2-7) with a high level of consistency (more than 75% of the participants
will categorize a statement as belonging to a specific domain).

2.2 Method
2.2.1 Participants
163 Americans (99 males) over the age of 18 (mean age = 37.09) participated in Study 1.

2.2.2 Procedure and Measures
After providing informed consent, participants were instructed that they would read
statements and be asked to categorize each statement into one of four categories: Religious,
Political, Factual, or Other. Following the instructions, participants were presented with 93
statements, in random order, and were asked to categorize each statement, one at a time. The
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intended categories were 30 political (e.g., “Open homosexuality makes the military weaker”),
30 factual (e.g., “Coca Cola is a brand of soda”), 22 religious (e.g., “Jesus walked on water
without sinking”), and 11 other (e.g., “Chocolate is better than vanilla”). For all religious,
political, and factual statements, participants were randomly presented with either a statement or
its opposite, but not both. For example, any given participant would see “God exists” or “God
does not exist,” but not both. A full list of statements and their opposites is shown in Appendix 1.
The political statements were designed to be meaningful to an American population and
were inspired by websites like http://www.democratichub.com/issues.aspx, which lists current
political issues. Both left-wing and right-wing statements were used. The religious statements
referred primarily to Christian concepts and stories (e.g., “Jesus,” “Mary,” etc.), although some
statements applied to concepts from other traditions as well (e.g., “God,” “Souls,” etc.). The
factual statements were straightforward statements about the world, although many of them were
false and some were deliberately designed such that the participant would be uncertain if they
were true or false. The “Other” category was composed of statements about values, opinions, or
nonsense.
Importantly, the religious and political statements were deliberately designed such that
they referred to states of the world as opposed to personal values or opinions. For example,
rather than the political statement saying “It is wrong for the military to allow open
homosexuality” (a statement about a value judgment), the statement said “Open homosexuality
makes the military weaker” (a statement about the world). In order to test epistemological
intuitions consistently across all domains, it was critical that all statements referred to states of
the world. If religious and political statements had referred to values or opinions, then several of
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the comparisons across domains would not be possible. For example, a value statement
(“Homosexuality is wrong”) is not verifiable without an accompanying universal definition of
wrongness. However, a statement referring to the world (“Open homosexuality makes the
military weaker”) is theoretically verifiable. For a full list of statements and intended categories
see Appendix 1.

2.3 Results
There were a total of 175 unique statements presented to participants, composed of 30
political (and 30 opposites), 30 factual (and 30 opposites), 22 religious (and 22 opposites), and
11 other (no opposites). The percentage of participants who categorized each statement in the
same category was calculated for each of the 175 statements. Hypothesis 1A was confirmed.
Twenty-three of the political, 33 factual, and 40 religious statements were categorized as
intended by at least 75% of participants (see Appendix 1). These statements were identified for
possible use in Studies 2-7.

2.4 Study 1 Discussion
In previous research on folk epistemology, researchers asked participants to respond to
statements in different domains. In these previous studies, however, researchers generated the
statements and decided on their own which domains the statements represented. In the current
research, participants were asked to categorize the statements in order to ensure that the
statements were understood as intended.
Moreover, because all statements were about the world, it was entirely possible that
participants could have categorized them all as facts. For example, the statement “Jesus walked
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on water without sinking” could be considered just as much a fact as “Michael Phelps swam in
water without sinking.” Study 1 ensured that participants understood the intended domains of
the statements that would be used in Studies 2-7. Study 1 generated statements that were
categorized in the intended domain by at least 75% of participants.
Based on the percentage of statements categorized as intended, it would appear that
participants found religious statements to be the most consistently identifiable (90% of religious
statements were categorized as intended by at least 75% of participants). The next most
consistently categorized were factual statements (55% of factual statements were categorized as
intended by at least 75% of participants). Lastly, 38% of political statements were categorized as
intended by at least 75% of participants. Some of the factual statements were false (e.g., “Limes
are a poor source of vitamin C”). False facts seemed to confuse participants, often being
categorized as “other,” perhaps because participants interpreted “fact” as meaning “true” (even
though the instructions said not to equate “fact” with “true”). Participants also appeared to use
particular terms to help them categorize statements. For example, in the political domain,
statements explicitly referring to the country or government institutions were among the most
consistently categorized as political. Finally, several statements that were intended to be political
were categorized by a significant proportion of participants as factual. This confusion between
the intended category (political) and what participants understood (factual) was exactly the
problem that Study 1 was designed to detect. These statements were not used in Studies 2-7.
Only statements that were consistently categorized as intended by at least 75% of participants
were used in Studies 2-7.

30

Chapter 3: Study 2 – Resolving Uncertainty
The goal of Study 2 was to determine if religiosity and political orientation, as measured
by the New Indices of Religious Orientation (Francis, 2007) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism
(Altemeyer, 2007) scales, respectively, correlated with the extent to which participants reported
that religious and political, but not factual statements, were true. In other words, Study 2
evaluated whether scores on the NIRO predicted how certain one was that religious statements
were true, and whether scores on the RWA predicted how certain one was that political
statements were true. (The NIRO scale is composed of three independent subscales: the extrinsic,
intrinsic, and quest orientations. For all analyses involving the NIRO, the intrinsic orientation
score was used. The intrinsic orientation deals with the personal belief aspect of religiosity,
which is most relevant to the current research.)
The purpose of measuring these correlations was to validate the materials that would be
used in Studies 3-7. It was important not only that participants could recognize the domain of the
statement (accomplished in Study 1) but also that the statements were shown to be religiously or
politically meaningful to participants. In addition, Study 2 sought to demonstrate that
participants find uncertainty to be more difficult to resolve in the religious and political domains
than in the factual domain. More specifically, the prediction in Study 2 was that factual
uncertainty arises from a lack of necessary information, whereas religious (and to a lesser extent
political) uncertainty arises from an “unknowableness” of religious (and political) propositions.
For example, if one is uncertain whether Tokyo is north or south of Philadelphia, one need only
consult a map to find the answer. However, if one is uncertain about whether God exists or not,
this uncertainty cannot be resolved by simple, available information.
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Resolving uncertainty offers a window into how participants think about acquiring
knowledge. If one finds uncertainty easy to resolve, it is because the proposition can be verified
by an observation in the world, its logical coherence can be evaluated, or some other readily
available method can be employed. Conversely, if one finds uncertainty difficult or impossible to
resolve, it signals a sense that the proposition is unknowable.

3.1 Hypotheses
Hypothesis 2A: Certainty that religious statements are true will correlate positively with
one’s NIRO score, and certainty that political statements are true will correlate positively with
one’s RWA score.
Hypothesis 2B: Participants will report that uncertainty in the religious domain is the
most difficult to resolve, followed by the political and then by the factual domain.

3.2 Method
3.2.1 Participants
158 Americans (104 males) over the age of 18 (mean age = 38.44), recruited from MTurk
participated in Study 2.

3.2.2 Procedure and Measures
After consenting to participate in the study, participants were presented with 30
statements in random order (10 religious, 10 political, and 10 factual), chosen from Study 1
based on being categorized in the intended domain by at least 75% of participants in Study 1.
After participants read each statement, they were asked the following questions:
32

Question 1: “Without doing any research, how certain are you that the following
statement is true or false?”
Participants indicated their degree of certainty by moving a slider, labeled as follows:
Left (0): “Extremely certain it’s false”; middle (50): “Uncertain”; right (100): “Extremely certain
it’s true.” The slider did not display any numbers to the participant in order to avoid consistency
bias (this was the case for all sliders in all studies). The starting position of the slider was in the
middle (50). Figure 1 shows an image of the slider.

Figure 1. Example of a slider used in the studies

Question 2: “Sometimes you are uncertain about the truth of a statement but it is very
easy to resolve your uncertainty. For example, consider the statement, “It is raining in Tokyo
right now.” You are probably uncertain whether this statement is true or false, but you could
easily resolve your uncertainty by looking up a weather report for Tokyo. However, sometimes
uncertainty is very difficult to resolve. For example, consider the statement, “Before time, there
was no universe and no physical matter.” If you were uncertain whether this is true or false, you
probably could not resolve your uncertainty with easily available information. Considering the
current statement below, how easy/difficult would it be to resolve uncertainty about whether this
statement is true or false?”
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Participants indicated how easy/difficult it would be to resolve uncertainty about the
statement by moving a slider. The slider was labeled as follows: Left: “Extremely easy to
resolve”; middle: “Moderate”; right: “Extremely difficult to resolve.” The starting position of the
slider was set in the middle. After providing their ratings for the 30 statements, participants
completed the NIRO (see Appendix 4), RWA (see Appendix 5), and demographic (see Appendix
6) questionnaires and were thanked for their participation in the study.
For a list of statements used in Study 2, see Appendix 2. In the factual domain,
statements included those that are obviously true, obviously false, and uncertain. In the religious
and political domains, most statements were “pro-religious” and right wing, and some were
“anti-religious” and left wing. The anti-religious and left-wing statements are marked with an
“(R)” after them in Appendix 2. These statements were reverse scored for certain analyses.

3.3 Results
Responses to question 1 (certainty of truth) were averaged across statements within the
same domain for each participant. This process generated a mean certainty-of-truth value for
each domain (religious, political, factual) for each participant. The same process was completed
for responses from question 2. Statements P1, P4, and R9 were reverse scored in order to remain
consistent (right wing vs. left wing in the political domain, and religious vs. anti-religious in the
religious domain).
RWA and NIRO scores were calculated for each participant. Correlations between mean
certainty scores and the RWA and NIRO scores were calculated for each domain. As may be
seen in Table 2, scores on both the RWA and the NIRO were significantly correlated with
participants’ certainty of the truth of statements in both the political and religious domains. There
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was no significant relation between RWA and NIRO scores and degree of certainty as to the
truth of factual statements.
Table 2. Correlations between mean certainty of truth and RWA and NIRO scores
Scale
Religious
Political
Factual
RWA
.634***
.572 ***
-0.09
NIRO
0.809***
0.349***
-0.011
Note. * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001
The mean difficulty-to-resolve-uncertainty scores for each participant and each domain
were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA as the dependent variable. The independent
variable was domain (political, religious, factual). As may be seen in Table 3, there was a large
difference in mean difficulty to resolve uncertainty, between the domains. There was a
statistically significant effect of domain on difficulty-to-resolve-uncertainty score F(2, 156) =
214.20, p < .001. All pairwise comparisons showed a significant difference, p < .001 in all cases.
Furthermore, as predicted, participants reported that religious uncertainty was the most difficult
to resolve followed by political followed by factual.

Table 3. Mean difficulty (SE) to resolve uncertainty and standard error according to domain
Domain
Mean difficulty (SE) to resolve uncertainty
Factual
11.72 (1.46)
Political
49.72 (1.37)
Religious
62.12 (2.44)

3.4 Study 2 Discussion
The primary finding from Study 2 was that people think of uncertainty differently across
the three domains tested. Factual uncertainty is seen as easily resolved, whereas political and
religious uncertainty are judged as more difficult to resolve. Because participants think of
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uncertainty so differently, it can be inferred that they also think of certainty differently. This
difference among domains supports the argument that religious (and some political) beliefs are
based on intuitive standards/principles different from those of factual beliefs. For example, some
form of verification is often used to determine if factual propositions are true whereas
verification is less often the basis for believing a religious proposition to be true. The relatively
high degree of difficulty to resolve political and religious uncertainty signals that participants
don’t feel those forms of knowledge can be acquired as easily and these domains are more
unknowable. Studies 3-7 test many of the specific differences in intuitive theories/principles that
people use to think about their own knowledge across the three domains.
Study 2 also showed that the statements used were valid and served their intended
purpose. Specifically, certainty that religious and political statements were true correlated with
two well-known scales of political orientation and religiosity – the RWA and NIRO. If it had
turned out that belief that the statements were true did not correlate with scores on the RWA or
the NIRO, then the meaning of the statements to participants would have been unclear. Because
religiosity and right-wing political orientation are highly correlated with each other, correlations
between religious certainty and RWA score and political certainty and NIRO score also were
observed. However, the overall goal to show that the statements have religious or political
meaning was accomplished.
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Chapter 4: Study 3 – Verification
The purpose of Study 3 was to investigate the epistemological concept of verification in
laypeople. Do laypeople think verification is important when determining what is true? Do they
think their beliefs are theoretically verifiable? Study 3 sought to demonstrate that laypeople
substantially rely on verification and they believe it to be an important component of justification
(the process for establishing what is true). More specifically, the prediction was that laypeople
believe that facts can be theoretically verified more than political beliefs, and that religious
beliefs are the least theoretically verifiable. This prediction follows from the view that political
and religious beliefs are less likely to depend on any state of the world or be justifiable through
evidence. Conversely, they are more likely to be acquired through the testimony of others,
particularly at a young age. For example, a belief like “Jesus is the son of God” may be
vigorously debated, but there is unlikely to be a state of the world that could satisfactorily
determine who is correct.
Another prediction in Study 3 was that highly religious individuals would value
verification less as a means of determining truth. This prediction was based on the idea that a
religious worldview involves non-normative methods for determining truth, such as revelation
and faith. Devaluing verification could be a way to reconcile the problem that propositions are
true, but nevertheless cannot be verified. For example, consider the belief that snake venom is
not harmful to Christians. There is no supporting evidence for this belief, and yet some people
believe it to be true, enough to motivate them to handle and be bitten by snakes. It is possible
that in order to reconcile the information from the world (snake bites are dangerous) with their
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conflicting belief (snake bites are harmless), believers would devalue verification as an
epistemological tool and, instead, rely on faith.

4.1 Hypotheses
Hypothesis 3A: Facts will be said to be theoretically verifiable most frequently, followed
by political and then religious statements.
Hypothesis 3B: There will be a negative correlation between scores on the NIRO and
responses to questions 2 and 3 (i.e., whether verifiability is necessary for knowing a proposition
is true and whether observable evidence in the world is the best proof that a proposition is true).
Hypothesis 3C: When asked generally (not with respect any statement in particular),
participants will respond that, on average, verifiability is necessary in order to know a statement
is true and that evidence in the world as the best form of proof.

4.2 Method
4.2.1 Participants
160 Americans (108 males) over the age of 18 (mean age = 40.46 years old), recruited
from MTurk, completed the study.

4.2.2 Procedure and Measures
Procedure for Part 1 of Studies 3-7
Studies 3-7 all included two parts. Part 1 for Studies 3-7 was identical. In Part 1,
participants were presented with 30 statements in random order, ten statements from each of the
three domains – political, factual, and religious (see Appendix 3 for a list of all statements).
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These 30 statements had been derived from Studies 1 and 2. Along with each of the 30
statements, participants were asked the following question:
Question 1: “Without doing any research, how certain are you that the following
statement is true?”
To respond, participants adjusted a slider from “Extremely uncertain” (0) to “Extremely
certain” (100), with “Moderately certain” (50) at the midpoint. The slider’s starting position was
at 0, under “Extremely uncertain” (see Fig. 1).
After answering question 1 for all 30 statements, Part 1 was complete, and participants
proceeded to Part 2. In Part 2, up to six statements from Part 1 (two religious, two political, and
two factual) were presented again to the participant. Only statements that the participant had
indicated were very certainly true (rated at least 85/100 on question 1 in Part 1) were selected
from Part 1 to be presented again in Part 2. If a participant didn’t rate at least two statements as
very certainly true (≥ 85) in a particular domain, then less than two statements were tested for
that domain in Part 2 (either 1 or 0 statements). If more than two statements were rated as very
certainly true from a particular domain, then only two statements were selected randomly for use
in Part 2. This method of selecting statements from Part 1 for use in Part 2 was identical for
Studies 3-7 and is depicted in Figure 2. After each statement was presented again in Part 2, the
participant was asked epistemological questions about that statement (e.g. “Do you think this
statement is verifiable?”). The “Folk Epistemology Questions” in Figure 2 represents the
epistemological questions that went with each statement presented in Part 2. The exact questions
that made up the “Folk Epistemology Questions” differed across Studies 3-7, but the general
flow and structure of all the studies was the same. It is to be recalled that even though the slider
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depicted in Figure 2 shows numbers, no numbers were shown to the participants in any of the
studies.
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Figure 2. Diagram of the procedure for Studies 3-7.
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After responding to all of the questions, participants completed the NIRO (see Appendix
4), RWA (see Appendix 5), and demographic (see Appendix 6) questionnaires, and were thanked
for their participation in the study.
Epistemological Comparisons Across Domains in Studies 3-7
Studies 3-7 investigated folk epistemological differences among the religious, political,
and factual domains. The overarching question that these studies examined was: do people
believe religious propositions (e.g., "God exists") or political propositions (e.g., “Most people on
welfare are abusing the system rather than looking for work”) in the same way that they believe
facts (e.g., "Maine is north of Florida")?
On the one hand, people take their religious and political beliefs very seriously. They
make important decisions based on them, like who they should marry, which medical treatments
they should seek, and which politicians they should support. People may point to personal
experiences as a source of religious and political belief. These observations suggest that people
represent their religious and political beliefs as equally verifiable, based on evidence, and as
objectively true, as factual beliefs. On the other hand, people also resist evidence that pertains to
these beliefs, adopt the religious and political propositions of their ingroup, and readily identify
outgroup beliefs as obviously false. These observations seem to indicate that people view
religious and political beliefs as categorically distinct from everyday facts.
Based on these opposing perspectives, it was not known in advance how people would
respond to epistemological questions about their religious, political, and factual beliefs.
Nevertheless, in Studies 3-7, the general prediction was made that participants differentially
think about the underlying epistemology for religious, political, and factual statements. For
42

example, in Study 3, it was predicted that factual statements would be viewed as most verifiable,
followed by political, and then religious statements. In other studies, predictions were made
about falsification, correspondence, obviousness, doubt, objectivity, and other concepts. In all
studies, the prediction was that people view religious and political beliefs as epistemologically
distinct from facts.
Moreover, several methodical measures were taken to ensure that valid comparisons of
folk epistemology could be made across domains. One goal of these measures was to prevent
participants from evaluating religious, political, and factual statements on the features that made
them simply, by definition, distinct. For example, the statement, “Strawberry ice cream is the
best flavor” is by definition subjective whereas, “Strawberry ice cream melts at a temperature of
70 degrees Fahrenheit,” is by definition objective. In order to minimize investigating purely
definitional differences, all statements used in the research referred to the world as opposed to
values or opinions. Hence they were theoretically, epistemologically equivalent across a number
of dimensions (e.g., they were all theoretically verifiable). For example, the political statement,
“The right to own guns makes society safer,” and the factual statement, “Germs are very small,”
are equally verifiable and falsifiable. They can be equally evaluated for their correspondence to
the world, coherence with other truth, and pragmatism.
Other methodological considerations were made to increase the validity of the
comparisons across domains. Where necessary, participants were instructed to consider the
epistemological concept “theoretically” (e.g., in Study 3 participants were asked if statements
were theoretically verifiable). This instruction was meant to prevent participants from
responding to whether a proposition was difficult versus easy to verify in practice.
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Certainty of truth was also controlled for in order to prevent lack of certainty from
affecting underlying folk epistemology. In Part 2 of Studies 3-7, participants only reflected upon
statements that they individually had rated in Part 1 as very certainly true (at least 85/100 in Part
1). Hence, the religious and political statements were never treated differently by participants
due to a lack of explicit certainty that they were true. In other words, all responses to the folk
epistemology questions in Part 2, were from participants who were very certain the target
statement was true.
Finally, for political and religious statements, it was entirely possible that participants
would refrain from responding in any way that could be interpreted as betraying uncertainty or
lack of belief, due to the negative feelings such an event might cause. Questions were designed
to be indirect and phrased to avoid causing participants to respond defensively.
Given these points, it was not obvious how participants would answer the
epistemological questions about factual, political, and religious statements in Studies 3-7.
Conceivably, it could have been the case that people viewed religious and political truth as
identical in nature to factual truth. Alternatively it could be that, as predicted, laypeople are
intuitively aware of a variety of departures from normative epistemology underlying their
religious and political beliefs. In addition, measures were taken to ensure that valid comparisons
of folk epistemology were made across domains, illuminating more than merely definitional
differences in statements.
Study 3 Procedure and Measures
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In Study 3, the “Folk Epistemology Questions” component from Figure 2 was designed
to test verification, and consisted of the following instructions and questions that were presented
to participants:
“Some statements can be proven to be true while others cannot. Please note, this is not
the same as whether a statement actually is true or not. In Part 2, we are not interested in whether
you think a statement is true or not. We are only interested in whether you think it is possible to
prove the statement to be true. To help understand what we mean, please consider examples in
the table below.
Statement

Conditions that would prove it to be true

Possible to
prove true?

There is intelligent life
on the moon

Astronauts travel to the moon and find intelligent
life there. (Please note, this statement is false, but it
is possible to prove it to be true.)

Yes

It is dark outside where
you are now

You look outside and see it is dark.

Yes

With other people’s help, you count every single
The number of hairs on hair on your body. (Please note: even though this
your body is even
would be very difficult, it is theoretically possible to
count every hair on your body.)
If Abraham Lincoln had
To prove this statement to be true you would need to
never been assassinated,
change something that has already occurred, which
the world would be a
is not even theoretically possible.
better place

Yes

No

Consider the following statement from Part 1: [Here one of the statements from Part 1
appeared]. Question 1: Do you think it is theoretically possible to prove that this statement is
true?” Participants could respond with a “yes” or a “no” to the question about verification.
After completing the Folk Epistemology Questions component (Part 2), participants in Study 3
then were asked two additional questions:
45

Question 2: “To what extent do you agree with the following statement: In order to know
a statement is true, it must be theoretically possible to prove it to be true.”
Question 3: “To what extent do you agree with the following statement: The best proof
that a statement is true is evidence that people can observe in the world.”
Both questions allowed the participant to respond with a slider from 0 – “Totally disagree” to
100 – “Totally agree.” All sliders did not display numbers, only words.

4.3 Results
In Part 1 of the study, some participants did not indicate that they were highly certain that
any statement was true for at least one of the domains. In other words, referring to Figure 2, one
or more of the “hats” was empty when transitioning from Part 1 to Part 2. Hence, in Part 2, these
participants only responded to epistemological questions about two or fewer domains. It was
preferable to have at least one data point for each participant for each domain in Part 2, so these
participants were excluded from the analyses, leaving 109 participants (78 males).
Participants responded to question 1 with a yes/no response, as to whether a statement
was verifiable or not. A chi-square analysis was used to determine if there were significantly
more “yes” versus “no” responses comparing across domains. As predicted, the highest
percentage of participants responded that factual statements were verifiable, followed by political
statements, followed by religious statements (see Fig. 3; chi square = 151.082, df = 2, p < .0001).
All pairwise comparisons were statistically significantly different: Political vs. religious chi
square = 52.02, df = 1, p < .0001; political vs. factual chi square = 26.79, df = 1, p < .0001;
factual vs. religious chi square = 133.81, df = 1, p < .0001).
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Percentage of Responses

Is this statement verifiable?
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Political

Religious

Factual

Yes

Figure 3: Frequency of “yes” responses to verification question

Mean slider responses and standard error for questions 2 and 3 are presented in Table 4.

Table 4. Mean slider responses (SE) to questions 2 and 3
Question 2 and 3: To what extent do you agree with the following
statement?
In order to know a statement is true, it must be theoretically possible to
prove it to be true.
The best proof that a statement is true is evidence that people can
observe in the world.

Mean Response (SE)
69.61 (3.32)
76.03 (2.86)

Scores on the NIRO were significantly negatively correlated with the slider responses on
questions 2 and 3. The correlation between NIRO score and question 2 was -.38 (p < .0001) and
between NIRO score and question 3 was -.46 (p < .0001).
To check for effects of religiosity and political orientation on responses to question 1
(Part 2), first the average number of “yes” responses was calculated for religious statements and
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for political statements. Then a correlation was calculated between the NIRO score and average
number of “yes” responses to religious statements. There was no significant correlation, r = .10,
p = .28. There was a weak, but significant correlation found between RWA scores and average
number of “yes” responses to question 1 with respect to political statements, r = .20, p = .04.

4.4 Study 3 Discussion
Study 3 tested how people think about verification with respect to political, religious, and
factual beliefs, and results confirmed all three hypotheses. Hypothesis 3A was supported: factual
statements were most frequently said to be verifiable, followed by political, followed by
religious statements. This finding was the primary goal of Study 3, and supports the argument
that religious and political beliefs depend relatively less on evidentialism, verification, or other
normative epistemological standards, compared to factual beliefs. Interestingly, believers who
were highly certain these propositions were true were willing to report their lack of verifiability.
Hypothesis 3B was supported. Those who scored more highly on the NIRO scale were
less likely to say that verification is the best way to justify beliefs. This finding suggests that
high-religiosity individuals do not view verification as the only or best path to determining what
is true (at least explicitly). It could be that higher religiosity individuals adopt alternative sources
of knowledge such as revelation, faith, or the testimony of others, and therefore come to think of
verification as relatively less valuable.
Hypothesis 3C was supported. Participants, overall, value verification as a means of
determining what is true. Participants responded with an average agreement rating of 69.61 (on a
scale from 0 to 100) that, “In order to know a statement is true, it must be theoretically possible
to prove it to be true.” This indicates that people do feel verification is a necessary component of
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justification. In addition, participants, on average, valued observable evidence in the world as the
best proof that a statement is true, responding with an average agreement rating of 76.03. This
finding indicates that people use evidentialism and observable states of the world in the process
of determining what is true.
In sum, more participants responded that facts were verifiable than said political and
religious beliefs were verifiable, but higher religiosity and right-wing individuals viewed
verification as less important for obtaining knowledge.
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Chapter 5: Study 4 – Falsification
The purpose of Study 4 was to investigate the epistemological concept of falsification in
laypeople. Do laypeople think falsification is important when determining what is true? Do they
think their own beliefs are theoretically falsifiable?
Study 4 sought to demonstrate that laypeople find factual beliefs most falsifiable
followed by political followed by religious beliefs, which are the least falsifiable. This prediction
was based on the idea that political and religious beliefs are less likely to depend on any state of
the world or be justifiable through evidence. In Study 3, a prediction was that laypeople hold
verification to be an important component of justification (the process for establishing what is
true). In Study 4, however, it was predicted that laypeople would value falsification less than
verification. This was predicted because attempting to prove a proposition is false in order to
support its truth could be counterintuitive and less useful to laypeople than verification. In
addition, previous research on the confirmation bias has shown that people often seek to verify
their hypotheses more than they seek to falsify them (Nickerson, 1998).
Another prediction in Study 4 was that highly religious individuals would value
falsification less as a means of determining truth compared to less religious individuals. This
prediction was based on the idea that a religious worldview involves methods for determining
truth, including revelation and faith, which do not depend on or relate to states of the world.
Truth depending on falsifiability conflicts with the religious worldview. In addition, pondering
conditions that would render one’s religious or political beliefs false has been shown to cause
negative affect (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000), and therefore it is possible that
highly religious individuals would avoid falsification or think of it as less useful.
50

5.1 Hypotheses
Hypothesis 4A: Facts will be said to be theoretically falsifiable most frequently, followed
by political and then religious statements.
Hypotheses 4B: People will on average, respond that falsifiability is necessary in order to
know a statement is true. However, the mean response will be lower than the mean response
from Study 3 regarding whether verifiability is necessary in order to know a statement is true.
Participants will, on average, value evidence in the world as the best proof that a proposition is
false.
Hypothesis 4C: There will be a negative correlation between scores on the NIRO scale
and responses to questions 2 and 3 (i.e., whether falsifiability is necessary for knowing a
proposition is true and whether observable evidence in the world is the best proof that a
proposition is false).

5.2 Method
5.2.1 Participants
154 Americans (105 males) over the age 18 (mean age = 40.2 years old), recruited from
MTurk, participated in the study.

5.2.2 Procedure and Measures
Part 1 of Study 4 was identical to that of Study 3. The structure of Part 2 was identical to
that of Study 3, except that the questions in Part 2 were different in order to test laypeople’s
views of falsification rather than verification. In Part 2, participants were presented with the
following instructions after each statement:
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“Some statements can be proven to be false while others cannot. Please note, this is not
the same as whether a statement actually is false or not.
In Part 2, we are not interested in whether you think a statement is false or not. We are
only interested in whether you think it is possible to prove the statement to be false. To help
understand what we mean, please consider examples in the table below.
Possible to
prove false?
Yes

Statement

Conditions that would prove it to be false

All swans are white
The moon is made of
cheese

You see a black swan
Astronauts travel to the moon and find it is not
Yes
made of cheese.
You learn that everyone has tricked you and
Barack Obama is not the president. He is actually
an actor who was hired to play the president as
Yes
part of the trick. (Note: In reality, Barack Obama
is the president but it is at least theoretically
possible to prove this statement to be false.)

Barack Obama is the
president

There is a species of fish
with an amazing type of
camouflage. The fish is so
camouflaged that it cannot
be detected by anything.

In order to prove this statement is false, it would
be necessary to prove that there is no such fish.
But the fish can avoid all detection so it's
theoretically impossible to prove it's not there.

No

Consider the following statement from Part 1:
[A statement from Part 1 appeared here.]
Question 1: Do you think it is theoretically possible to prove that this statement is false?”
After completing Part 2, participants then were asked to answer the following two
additional questions, and responded to each using a slider that ranged from 0 – “Totally
disagree” to 100 – “Totally agree”:
Question 2: “To what extent do you agree with the following statement: In order to know
a statement is true, it must be theoretically possible to prove it to be false.”
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Question 3: “To what extent do you agree with the following statement: The best proof
that a statement is false is evidence that you can observe in the world.”

5.3 Results
In Part 1 of the study, some participants did not indicate that they were highly certain that
any statement was true for at least one of the three domains. It was preferable to have at least one
data point for each participant for each domain, so these participants were excluded from the
analyses, leaving a remaining 96 participants (71 males).
Participants responded with a yes/no response as to whether a statement was falsifiable or
not. Significantly fewer participants responded that religious statements were falsifiable.
Interestingly, political statements were classified as falsifiable by a slightly greater percentage of
participants than were factual statements (see Fig. 4). A chi-square analysis revealed that
differences were statistically significant across domains, chi square = 65.24, df = 2, p < .0001.
All comparisons were significantly different: Political vs. religious chi square = 61.34, df = 1, p
< .0001; political vs. factual chi square =7.21, df = 1, p = .007; factual vs. religious chi square
=31.46, df = 1, p < .0001).
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Is this statement falsifiable?
Percentage of Responses

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Factual

Religious

Political

Yes

Figure 4: Frequency of “yes” responses to falsification question

Mean slider responses and standard errors for questions 2 and 3 are given in Table 5.
Table 5. Mean slider responses (SE) to questions 2 and 3
Question 2 and 3: To what extent do you agree with the following
statement?
In order to know a statement is true, it must be theoretically possible
to prove it to be false.
The best proof that a statement is false is evidence that people can
observe in the world.

Mean Response (SE)
58.53 (3.66)
69.77 (2.99)

Scores on the NIRO were not significantly correlated with the slider responses on
question 2, but there was a negative correlation with responses to question 3. The correlation
between NIRO score and question 2 was -.04 (p = .66) and between NIRO score and question 3
was -.27 (p = .01).
To check for effects of religiosity and political orientation on responses to question 1, the
average number of “yes” responses was calculated for religious statements and for political
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statements. Then a correlation was calculated between the NIRO score and average number of
“yes” responses to religious statements. There was no significant correlation, r = .19, p = .07.
There also was no significant correlation found between RWA scores and average number of
“yes” responses to question 1 with respect to political statements, r = -.06, p = .53.

5.4 Study 4 Discussion
Hypothesis 4A was partially supported. The primary finding was that, as predicted, a
significantly larger percentage of participants responded that religious statements were
unfalsifiable compared to factual or political statements. It is to be noted that factual statements
were said to be falsifiable less frequently than were political statements. It is possible that the
participants could not imagine a realistic way to falsify an obviously true fact. For example, what
would be required to falsify a statement like, “Coca Cola is a brand of soda?” Only a massive
conspiracy involving the entire population of the world could be the answer. So even though
such a statement is theoretically falsifiable, it may have been difficult for participants to imagine
a set of circumstances in which falsification could occur. A number of participants may have
responded that obviously true facts were unfalsifiable, thereby misunderstanding the theoretical
possibility of falsification. This potential misunderstanding does not diminish the validity of the
data with respect to religious statements. The instructions asked participants if they could
imagine a set of circumstances in which the statement could be false. Even if participants were
unable to correctly apply the idea of theoretical falsifiability to factual statements, the finding
that participants could not imagine a set of circumstances that would cause their religious beliefs
to be false still reveals an interesting difference in how people think about religious versus
factual beliefs.
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Hypothesis 4B was supported. Participants responded with an average agreement rating
of 58.53 (on a scale ranging from 0 to 100, with 50 representing moderately in agreement), that,
“In order to know a statement is true, it must be theoretically possible to prove it to be false.”
This indicates that people do value falsification but less so than verification, which scored an
average agreement rating of 69.61 that, “In order to know a statement is true, it must be
theoretically possible to prove it to be true.” However, participants on average valued evidence
in the world as the best proof that a statement is false, responding with an average agreement
rating of 69.77. This finding indicates that people on average use evidentialism and observable
states of the world in the process of determining what is false.
Hypothesis 4C was not supported. There was not the predicted negative correlation
between degree of religiosity as measured by scores on the NIRO and valuing falsifiability
(question 2), although there was a negative correlation between the NIRO scores and valuing
observable evidence in the world (question 3). Hypothesis 4C was based on the idea that a
religious worldview depends less on evidentialism and that attempting to falsify religious beliefs
might cause negative affect (Tetlock et al., 2000). It is still possible that these influences
diminish the extent to which one values falsification as an epistemological tool.
The concept of falsification may well have been counterintuitive to many of the
participants. If one were unfamiliar with falsification, it is possible that a proposition would
appear less true if it could theoretically be proven false. In the instructions, participants were
educated about the meaning of falsification and provided with several examples. However, they
were not instructed about exactly how to value falsification or why it functions well in advancing
true hypotheses. It seems likely that the distribution of responses to questions 2 and 3 was
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primarily influenced by an understanding of falsification (those who understood falsification
more valued it more), more than it was influenced by religiosity level. The failure to find a
significant negative correlation does not call into question the validity of the other findings nor
does it rule out the possibility that religiosity does negatively correlate with valuing falsification
under circumstances in which the role of falsification is well understood by the participants.
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Chapter 6: Study 5 – Theories of Truth
The purpose of Study 5 was to investigate three theories of truth from academic
epistemology in laypeople: correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic. Study 5 also explored the
extent to which people rely on two sources of knowledge: testimony of others and faith.
Specifically, Study 5 asked which of these theories of truth laypeople intuitively understand and
use when asked to define why a proposition is true, and whether there would be differences
depending on the domain. How do testimony of others and faith serve as sources of knowledge
across domains?
Study 5 made several predictions. It was predicted that laypeople would report that their
religious and political beliefs correspond to the world less, and cohere with other true
propositions less than factual beliefs do. These predictions were based on two ideas. One is that
many religious and political propositions do not accurately describe any state of the world and
are inconsistent with other true propositions. As a consequence, these propositions cannot be true
by virtue of correspondence or coherence. For example, consider the statement, “Noah put all
animal species onto an ark to save them from a flood.” Such a statement refers to the world.
However, nothing in the world convincingly corroborates it. There is nothing in the world that
suggests such an ark or flood existed. True propositions about animal species also conflict with
such a claim. It would be impossible for an ark to house millions of animal species, each
requiring complex habitats, resources, and so on. Neither correspondence nor coherence can
function as defining properties of truth.
The second idea inspiring this prediction is that people do not want their religious and
political beliefs to be held hostage by correspondence or coherence. In other words, the idea that
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religious and political propositions could be proven to be false based on a lack of correspondence
or coherence is unacceptable to believers, and therefore these properties must not define why
these propositions are true.
It also was predicted in Study 5 that people would be more likely to endorse the
pragmatic theory for defining the truth of religious and political propositions more than factual
propositions. Consequences and functionality of belief are used in the religious and political
domains more than in the factual domain as a defining property of truth. A lay version of the
pragmatic theory was investigated in Study 5 where the function of truth is tied to the good of
society. For example, “When everyone believes in God, society works better.”
It was predicted that laypeople would say that the testimony of others is more a source of
knowledge in the religious and political domains compared to the factual domain. The
explanation for this prediction is that people often adopt religious and political ideas from their
ingroup as opposed to acquiring them from observation. For example, the evidence surrounding
a political issue like climate change is inaccessible to laypeople, yet many report to be extremely
certain about whether humans are causing global warming. Many religious and political
propositions are acquired at a young age without any opportunity for critical analysis. In order to
explore how laypeople rely on testimony across domains, Study 5 included one question about
reliance on trust in others and one about the importance of acquiring the belief before 25 years of
age.
Finally, Study 5 explored the idea of faith by asking people if their beliefs need to be
justified in order to be true. The prediction was that participants would say religious beliefs
require the least justification followed by political and then factual. The rationale for this
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prediction was that religious believers rely on faith as a source of knowledge rather than
justification. In addition, both religious and political believers might not want the truth of their
beliefs to depend on justification, preferring for it to be outside the reach of any process that
could prove it to be false.

6.1 Hypotheses
Hypothesis 5A: When determining a statement to be true, participants will use
correspondence theory mostly for factual statements, followed by political followed by religious
statements.
Hypothesis 5B: When determining a statement to be true, participants will use coherence
theory mostly for factual statements, followed by political followed by religious statements.
Hypothesis 5C: When determining a statement to be true, participants will use the
pragmatic theory (a lay version of it) mostly for religious/political statements, and less for factual
statements.
Hypothesis 5D: When determining a statement to be true, participants will rely on
trusting others most for religious statements, followed by political followed by factual
statements.
Hypothesis 5E: Participants will report that religious statements would be least likely to
be believed if encountered after the age of 25, followed by political, followed by factual
statements.
Hypothesis 5F: Participants will report that they need justification the least to know
religious statements are true, followed by political, followed factual statements.
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6.2 Method
6.2.1 Participants
152 American participants (97 male) over the age of 18 (mean age 37.11), recruited from
MTurk, participated in the study.

6.2.2 Procedure and Measures
Study 5 investigated people’s theory of truth/justification (i.e., why/how do you think this
statement is true?) across the three domains. Three well-known, philosophical theories of truth
were tested: correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic. Two additional bases for truth were
tested: faith (which was tested by asking participants how much they need to justify a statement
in order to believe it), and trust in other people/indoctrination (meant to investigate how
laypeople use the testimony of others).
Participants completed Part 1, just as in the previous studies. In Part 2, along with each
statement, participants were presented with the following questions in random order.
Correspondence
“People have different reasons for believing what is true. Sometimes, people believe that
a statement is true because specific events or circumstances in the world make the statement true.
So, a person might say: “I believe this statement is true because of these circumstances or events
in the world. If these circumstances or events were different, then the statement might not be
true.”
However, sometimes people believe that a statement is true independent of any
circumstances or events in the world. So, a person might say: “I believe this statement is true
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independent of circumstances or events in the world. Even if the world were different, I would
still believe this statement is true.”
In Part 1 you indicated that you were highly certain that the statement below is true. Do
you believe that the statement below is true because of circumstances or events in the world, or
independent of circumstances or events in the world?
[A statement from Part 1 appeared here].
Question 1: Why do you believe this statement is true?” [Participants saw a slider labeled
0, “Completely because of circumstances or events in the world” to 100, “Completely
independent of circumstances or events in the world”].
Coherence
“Some people think that in order for a statement to be true it must be consistent with all
other information that we already know is true. According to this perspective, all true statements
fit together like pieces of a big puzzle. Each piece of the puzzle is connected to other pieces. If a
statement does not fit into the puzzle, then it is not consistent with other true statements and
cannot be true.
Alternatively, some people think that it is possible for statements to be true that are not
consistent with one another. According to this perspective, statements can be true even if they do
not fit with other true statements.
In Part 1 you indicated that you were highly certain that the statement below is true. We
are interested in which perspective best describes why you feel the statement below is true.
Using the slider below, please indicate how consistent you think the statement below is with
everything else in the world that is true.
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[A statement from Part 1 appeared here].
Question 2: How consistent is this statement with everything you know is true in the
world?” [Participants saw a slider from 0, “Completely inconsistent with everything that is true”
to 100, “Completely consistent with everything that is true”].
Pragmatic
“Some people think that a statement can be true because when everyone believes the
statement is true, society works better. For example, some people think that the statement
“voting in large elections is a good use of one’s time” is a true statement because if everyone
believes that voting is a good use of time, then democracy functions well.
In Part 1 you indicated that you were highly certain that the statement below is true. To
what extent do you think the statement below is true because when everyone believes this
statement is true, there is a positive effect on society?
[A statement from Part 1 appeared here].
Question 3: To what extent do you think this statement is true because when everyone
believes this statement is true, there is a positive effect on society?” [Participants saw a slider
labeled 0, “A positive effect on society has nothing to do with why this statement is true” to 100,
“A positive effect on society has a lot to do with why this statement is true”].
Testimony
“Sometimes, in order to believe a statement is true, we need to trust what someone else
told us. For example, if your friend tells you that someone has been saying mean things about
you behind your back, then you’ll probably believe your friend because you trust your friend.
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However, sometimes we believe what people tell us without needing to trust them. For example,
when you ask a complete stranger what time it is, the stranger looks at their watch and then tells
you the time. You believe the stranger, but there is almost no trust required to believe the
stranger.
In Part 1 you indicated that you were highly certain that the statement below is true. How
much trust in other people is required in order to believe this statement is true?
[A statement from Part 1 appeared here].
Question 4: How much trust in other people is required in order to believe this statement
is true? [Participants saw a slider labeled 0, ‘No trust required’ to 100, ‘High level of trust
required’].
Question 5: Imagine that a person grew up in a place where there was no information
available about the statement below. This person never received any information about the
statement below, before the age of 25. Then, at the age of 25, this person learned information
relevant to the statement below. How likely do you think it is that this 25-year-old person would
believe the statement below is true?”
[A statement from Part 1 appeared here].
[Participants saw a slider labeled 0, “Extremely unlikely” to 100, “Extremely likely”].
Justification vs. Faith
“People have different reasons for believing what is true. Sometimes, people believe that
a statement is true because they believe that they can justify that the statement is true. According
to this perspective, if the statement cannot be justified, then it is not true.
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In contrast, sometimes people believe that a statement is true without needing to believe that they
can justify that the statement is true. According to this perspective, even if the person cannot
justify that the statement is true, the person still believes the statement is true.
In Part 1 you indicated that you were highly certain that the statement below is true. To
what extent do you need justification in order to believe the statement below is true?
[A statement from Part 1 appeared here].
Question 6: To what extent do you need justification in order to believe the statement is
true?” [Participants saw a slider labeled 0, “Completely do not need justification” to 100,
“Completely need justification”].

6.3 Results
In Part 1 of the study, some participants did not indicate that they were highly certain that
any statement was true for at least one domain. It was preferable to have at least one data point
for each participant for each domain, so these participants were excluded from the analyses
leaving a remaining 98 participants (63 males).
Participants could see the same question up to two times per domain (for up to two
statements per domain). For all the questions with sliders, the mean response was calculated for
each question, each participant, and each domain. To compare across domains, these mean
response values were entered into repeated measures ANOVAs. The independent variable for
each ANOVA was the domain, and the dependent variable was the mean slider response (see
Table 6 for means and ANOVA results).
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Table 6. Theories of truth/justification, mean slider responses, and p values from ANOVA tests –
Study 5
p values from comparisons
Question

Political Religious Factual
F
Political Political Religious
Mean
Mean
Mean
vs.
vs.
vs.
(SE)
(SE)
(SE)
Religious Factual Factual
Correspondence
21.68
57.60
56.34
71.74
***
***
1
(2.24)
(3.47)
(3.79)
Coherence
75.72
72.03
85.55
12.54
0.71
**
***
(2.32)
(2.78)
(2.26)
Pragmatic
61.97
39.77
26.92
40.27
***
**
***
(3.14)
(3.50)
(3.18)
Trust
48.76
43.18
23.63
26.61
0.606
***
***
(3.15)
(3.77)
(2.84)
Indoctrination
63.24
62.1
81.64
21.78
1
***
***
(2.62)
(2.96)
(2.51)
Justification
56.03
38.85
33.09
15.81
***
***
0.616
(3.16)
(3.53)
(3.54)
Note. The question column displays a summary of the question or prompt that the participants
saw. The political mean, religious mean, and factual mean columns show the means of the mean
slider responses to each question for each domain. df for all ANOVAS were (2, 96). * p <.05; **
p <.01; *** p <.001.

6.4 Study 5 Discussion
Hypothesis 5A was not supported. Participants responded that they relied on
correspondence mostly for political truth followed by factual/religious. This result unfortunately
does not offer concrete evidence for an alternative explanation. However, one suggestion is that
laypeople do not think about correspondence when defining why their beliefs are true. As
discussed above, the concept of correspondence can seem too obvious such that it’s circular and
confusing, especially to laypeople. The abstruse nature of correspondence might preclude its
intuitive functionality in laypeople. Given the results of Study 3, however, it seems likely that
some lay version of correspondence is used for all kinds of observable, verifiable facts.
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However, explicit access to this epistemological principle may be limited. To explain
why political statements received the highest ratings, one guess is that participants focused on
the mention of “events or circumstances in the world,” in the instructions. Philosophers often
refer to the “world” as meaning simply everything in existence, and “events” as meaning
anything that occurs. But it is possible that participants associated the “world” with locations
outside the U.S., as in “world news,” and “events” with something like “current events,” which
are often political. This putative confusion about the meaning of these terms then would be a
reason for why they responded that “events in the world” were the basis for their political beliefs,
but less so for their religious or factual beliefs.
Hypothesis 5B was supported: Participants responded that their factual beliefs cohere
with other truths more than religious/political beliefs. It was possible that people might represent
exceptions to rules as a way of avoiding inconsistency. For example, consider the statement,
“Jesus walked on water without sinking.” A believer could say, “Walking on water is impossible
but because Jesus was divine, he was able to do it.” By making this type of exception, a believer
could therefore reason that all of these propositions cohere perfectly. But it appears that instead,
laypeople think of religious/political beliefs as being less consistent than factual beliefs with
other knowledge.
Hypothesis 5C was supported. Philosophers who consider themselves pragmatists define
a proposition to be true when it functions best for a particular purpose (e.g., propositions about
the nature of a medication are true if the medication cures disease). In Study 5, a lay version of
the pragmatic theory was tested in which participants were asked if their belief is true because
when people believe it is true then society works better. Participants attributed their belief that
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both religious and political statements were true to this version of pragmatism, more than they
did for factual beliefs. The effect was greatest for the political domain. This finding does not
present a problem for the interpretation of the results, but a difference between religious and
political domains was not predicted. It may be that the word “society” and the example of voting
in elections in the instructions caused participants to think about political repercussions the most,
even though the question did not intend to have participants focus on the political consequences
of belief.
In academic epistemology, philosophers often are interested in the extent to which we can
rely on the testimony of others as a source of knowledge. Questions 4 and 5 were designed to test
the extent to which trust in authority and indoctrination are the sources for belief in the political,
religious, and factual domains. Hypothesis 5D was supported. Participants responded that they
rely more on trust in what others told them, in order to believe political and religious statements,
compared to factual statements. Hypothesis 5E also was supported. Participants responded that
the likelihood of belief, if the relevant information was only discovered after the age of 25,
would be lower for political and religious statements compared to factual statements. Both of
these findings are consistent with the idea that people are more likely to have acquired their
political and religious beliefs from others, particularly at a young age, as opposed to having
acquired them from observation, verification, and evidentialism.
Hypothesis 5F was not supported. Participants responded that they needed to justify
political statements the most followed by religious/factual, which were not significantly different
from each other. Question 6 was intended to test how participants use justification for their
beliefs in the political, religious, and factual domains. The predicted result was that participants
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would say that religious statements needed less justification because they can be known through
faith. But this prediction, surprisingly, was not confirmed. By asking participants if their beliefs
“need” to be justified in order to be true, question 6 was supposed to cause participants to reflect
on which types of beliefs can be true without justification. While it cannot be known for sure,
one possible explanation is that phrasing the question this way may have caused participants to
think about when they felt they “needed” to justify these beliefs to other people in real-life
conversations. Under this interpretation, participants may have envisioned a political debate as
the only instance in which they would likely need to produce justification for their beliefs.
Furthermore, it may have sounded strange to think about “needing” to justify an obvious fact like
“Coca Cola is a brand of soda,” for example.
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Chapter 7: Study 6 – Objectivity
Study 6 investigated the concept of objectivity. Similar to previous studies (Goodwin &
Darley, 2008, 2012), Study 6 looked at the extent to which people feel that their beliefs are
objectively versus subjectively true across different domains. When people feel their belief is
objectively true, that means it is true for everyone, and anyone who disagrees with them is
mistaken. Alternatively, when someone feels their belief is subjectively true, that means it is true
for them, and yet it is possible for others to hold opposing, subjectively true beliefs. Therefore, if
someone disagrees, then that person may not necessarily be mistaken. A third dimension,
nihilism also was explored. If a believer is nihilistic about a proposition, then she doesn’t think it
is possible to say whose perspective is correct in the event of a disagreement. The proposition is
not objectively true for everyone nor is it subjectively true for each individual.
It was predicted that participants would find factual statements to be the most objectively
true, followed by religious/political statements. This was predicted because factual propositions
are based most clearly on universal, normative, epistemological standards. It also was predicted
that participants would be most nihilistic about religious statements followed by political and
then factual statements. This was predicted because religious propositions violate normative
epistemological standards the most and therefore, in the case of a disagreement, establishing who
is correct is very difficult or impossible.
Study 6 also explored tolerance of disagreement. How do people feel about those who
disagree with them across the three domains? Disagreement was used as a window into how
people think about the nature of their own beliefs. For example, it was predicted that people
would rate those who disagreed about facts as lower on intelligence and reasonableness
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compared to those who disagreed about political and religious statements. The rationale behind
this prediction was that people feel that belief in facts depends on an intelligent, reasonable
appreciation of reality whereas belief in political or religious propositions does not. Laypeople
understand that political and religious propositions are not based on universal, objectively true
pieces of evidence, but rather on other influences (for example, one’s group affiliation).
Therefore, holding an opposing political or religious belief wouldn’t say anything about one’s
intelligence or reasonableness.
Conversely, it was predicted that holding an opposing political or religious view would
signal an immoral nature, whereas holding an opposing factual view would signal nothing about
a person’s morality. Because opposing religious and political views signal one’s outgroup
affiliation, and because people denigrate outgroup members, it was predicted that participants
would rate political and religious opponents as lower on moral qualities and as less desirable to
interact with socially.

7.1 Hypotheses
Hypothesis 6A: Participants will select choice A, that the person who disagrees with them
is mistaken, more often when responding to factual statements and less when responding to
political/religious statements. Choice B, that neither person is mistaken in the case of
disagreement, will be selected most for political statements followed by religious and then
factual statements. Choice C, that it is impossible to say who is right in the case of a
disagreement, will be selected most frequently in response to religious statements, followed by
political and then factual statements.
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Hypothesis 6B: Participants will rate those who disagree with factual statements lower on
intelligence and reasonableness, followed by those who disagree on political and then religious
statements. Participants will rate those who disagree on political/religious statements lower on
moral qualities like goodness, fairness, honesty, and kindness, but higher on dogmatism,
compared to those who disagree on factual statements.
Hypothesis 6C: Participants will be more opposed to being friends with, dating, and
being roommates with political and religious opponents than with factual opponents.

7.2 Method
7.2.1 Participants
161 Americans (106 males) over the age of 18 (mean age = 41.25 years old), recruited
from MTurk workers, completed the study.

7.2.2 Procedure and Measures
After completing Part 1, participants were presented with the following instructions along
with each of the statements selected from Part 1. The statements were presented in random order,
but for each statement, participants first saw the objectivism versus subjectivism question and
next saw the tolerance questions (as they are written below).
Objectivism versus subjectivism.
Question 1: “Please read the following statement. Then answer the question below about
this statement.
[A statement from Part 1 appeared here].
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Your previous response indicated that you are highly certain that the statement above is
true. Imagine someone who disagrees with you about the statement above. This person thinks the
statement above is definitely false. Please choose the option that most closely represents how
you feel about the disagreement between you and this person:
A) The person who disagrees with me is mistaken.
B) Neither one of us is mistaken, we could both be correct.
C) It is impossible to say who is right or wrong.”
Choice A was meant to capture objectivism/absolutism. Choice B was meant to capture
subjectivism/relativism. Choice C was meant to capture something like a lay version of nihilism.
Tolerance versus intolerance.
“Please read the following statement. Then answer the questions below about this
statement.
[A statement from Part 1 appeared here].
Your previous response indicated that you are highly certain that the statement above is
true. Imagine someone who disagrees with you about the statement above. This person thinks the
statement above is definitely false.
Question 2: Think about the person who thinks the statement above is false. What kind of
person do you imagine he/she is? Please rate this person on the following traits. [Participants saw
separate sliders for intelligent, morally good, fair, honest, dogmatic, reasonable, kind].
Think about the person who thinks the statement above is false. How opposed would you
be to each of the following?
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Question 3: How opposed would you be to being friends with this person?” [Participants
saw a slider from 0, ‘Not opposed at all’ to 100, ‘Extremely opposed.’]
Question 4: How opposed would you be to dating this person? [Participants saw a slider
from 0, ‘Not opposed at all’ to 100, ‘Extremely opposed.’]
Question 5: How opposed would you be to being roommates with this person?”
[Participants saw a slider from 0, “Not opposed at all” to 100, “Extremely opposed.”]

7.3 Results
In Part 1 of the study, some participants did not indicate that they were highly certain that
any statement was true for at least one domain. It was preferable to have at least one data point
for each participant for each domain, so these participants were excluded from the analyses,
leaving 104 participants (74 males).
For question 1, participants were most objective about factual statements (as predicted),
followed by religious followed by political statements. As may be seen in Figure 5, participants
were most subjective about political statements followed by religious followed by factual, and
most nihilistic about religious statements followed by political followed by factual statements.
Results from a chi-square test of independence revealed a significant difference among domains
(chi square = 90.361, df = 4, p < .0001). All pairwise comparisons were significantly different:
Political vs. religious chi square =15.73, df = 2, p < .001; political vs. factual chi square = 60.80,
df = 2, p < .0001; factual vs. religious chi square = 60.03, df = 2, p < .0001).
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Percentage of Responses

How do you feel about the disagreement between you and this person?
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Political

Religious

Factual

Type of Statment
The person who disagrees with me is mistaken
Neither one of us is mistaken, we could both be correct
It is impossible to say who is correct or incorrect

Figure 5: Responses to objectivity question

Just as in the previous studies, the responses to the slider questions were averaged and the
mean responses were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA in which the independent
variable was the domain and the dependent variable was the slider responses. (For results of the
ANOVA tests see Table 7.)
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Table 7. Questions and results from ANOVA tests – Study 6
p values from comparisons
Question

How intelligent is this person?
How morally good is this
person?
How fair is this person?
How honest is this person?
How dogmatic is this person?
How reasonable is this person?
How kind is this person?

Political Religious Factual F Political Political Religious
Mean
Mean
Mean
vs.
vs.
vs.
(SE)
(SE)
(SE)
Religious Factual Factual
42.73
43.18
18.79 43.79
1
***
***
(2.41)
(2.73)
(2.21)
45.33
49.47
50.64 3.15 .181
.067
1
(2.45)
(2.40)
(2)
44.56
48.74
45.39 2.17 .145
1
.461
(2.40)
(2.26) (1.93)
52.24
52.96
45.07 5.99
1
**
**
(2.38)
(2.53) (2.24)
56.72
59.50
52.41 3.45 .753
.154
*
(2.28)
(2.69) (2.22)
39.59
41.54
27.34 14.85
1
***
***
(2.18)
(2.52) (2.40)
48.35
52.64
50.61 2.17 .119
.934
.940
(2.46)
(2.03) (1.92)
31.75
29.92
40.42 4.68
1
*
*
(3.20)
(3.10) (3.32)
50.34
56.90
58.56 3.29 .149
.076
1
(3.60)
(3.49) (3.65)
39.89
39.15
47.58 2.71
1
.099
.115
(3.48)
(3.66) (3.36)

How opposed would you be to
being friends with this person?
How opposed would you be to
dating is this person?
How opposed would you be to
being roommates with this
person?
Note. The question column displays a summary of the question or prompt that the participants
saw. The political mean, religious mean, and factual mean columns show the means of the mean
slider responses to each question for each domain. df for all ANOVAS were (2, 112). * p <.05; ** p
<.01; *** p <.001.

7.4 Study 6 Discussion
Hypothesis 6A was supported. The largest percentage of participants responded that
factual statements were objectively true, followed by religious followed by political statements.
76

The reverse pattern was true for which statements were most subjective. The greatest percentage
of nihilistic responses corresponded to religious statements, followed by political followed by
factual statements, as predicted.
Hypotheses 6Band 6C were mostly unsupported. As predicted, participants responded
that those who disagreed with them about factual statements were less intelligent and less
reasonable compared to those who disagreed about political or religious statements. This finding
supports the argument that people do not think of religious and political truth as normative,
reasonable, or the result of intelligent comprehension of reality.
Responses about an opponent’s goodness, fairness, or kindness, however, showed no
significant differences across domains. Interestingly, participants responded that someone who
disagreed about factual statements was less honest, possibly because they thought anyone who
said obviously true facts were false would have to be lying. In addition, the responses to the
questions about being friends, dating, or being roommates were also not as predicted. The only
significant difference was that participants said they would want to be friends least with someone
who disagreed about facts – again probably because participants figured someone who thought
obviously true facts were false would have to be lying or somehow impaired.
One possibility for this pattern of findings is that people view intolerance as immoral.
Judging an outgroup member poorly or refusing to socialize with them could be viewed as a
form of bigotry in oneself. The entire set of predictions revolved around people’s propensity to
denigrate the outgroup. This manipulation either failed to provoke a negative reaction towards
the outgroup, or participants did not want to reveal prejudiced feelings towards others.
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Chapter 8: Study 7 – Features of Uncertainty
Study 7 explored beyond academic principles to investigate more intuitive ideas related
to knowledge. Several concepts were chosen for investigation. These concepts were chosen to
illuminate different dimensions of overall certainty and nature of belief. In Part 2 of Study 7,
participants were asked to consider the religious, political, and factual statements that they had
indicated were certainly true in Part 1. Participants were asked how much effort was required to
believe that the statement was true, how obvious that truth was, how reasonable belief was, how
frequently they doubted the truth of the statement, and whether they would say they “believed”
versus “knew” the statement was true. Each of these questions captured a different intuitive piece
of overall certainty and belief. By asking about certainty indirectly, the design aimed to more
accurately assess participants’ intuitions.
In Study 7, people also were asked to think about another person who disagreed with
them. Rather than report how they tolerated this other person (as was done in Study 6),
participants were asked to report how they would feel listening to counterarguments against their
religious, political, and factual beliefs. Asking participants to react to counterarguments was yet
another, indirect method of revealing their intuitions about their own beliefs. Participants also
were asked to evaluate the qualities of the counterarguments and say whether they would avoid
listening to them.
It was predicted that participants would report that religious and political statements
required more effort to believe, were less obviously true, and were less reasonable to believe
than factual statements. It was predicted that participants would report that they doubted
religious and political beliefs more often than factual ones, and that they “believed” religious and
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political statements, and “knew” factual statements were true. The rationale for these predictions
was that people are less certain that religious/political propositions are true compared to factual
ones, at least in the sense that “true” equates to tracking reality. To the extent that “true” means
something else (e.g., signaling group membership or signaling features about oneself), Study 7
did not offer any evidence. “Believe” and “know” were assumed to have slightly different
meanings to participants. Both words refer to accepting that a proposition is true. However,
“believe” allows for more subjectivity (as in a “personal belief”) and depends less on an
objective representation of reality. “Know,” conversely, has more of an objective, universally
true connotation that refers to tracking reality based on normative standards.
When asked how they would feel listening to counterarguments, it was predicted that
participants would be more likely to experience negative emotions (anger, offense, disgust, and
guilt) in reaction to religious/political counterarguments whereas they would be more likely to
feel confusion and surprise towards factual counterarguments. The rationale for this prediction
was that negative emotions occur when one feels their political/religious identify is threatened by
a counterargument. Negative emotions do not make sense if one finds the counterarguments to
be obviously untrue. Surprise and confusion, however, make sense when one finds the content of
the counterarguments to be obviously untrue. As a control, participants were asked about some
additional emotional states, such as happiness and fear. It was predicted that there would be no
difference in happiness and fear levels across domains.
It was predicted that participants would find religious/political counterarguments more
valuable, more predictable, more logical, and would avoid them more than factual
counterarguments. The rationale here was that people are aware that their religious and political
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beliefs do not always track reality and can be exposed as untrue by well-reasoned
counterarguments. For example, if one believes that Jesus' mother, Mary, was a virgin when she
gave birth to Jesus, one might accept that counterarguments would be logical, predictable, and
reasonable. Avoiding these counterarguments could be a way to minimize the negative
experience of confronting conflicting representations of truth.
The overall goal of Study 7 was to provide a window into the nature of certainty of truth
from several different angles. If all of the different dimensions of belief showed the predicted
domain differences in Study 7, it would offer strong support for the view that people do not think
political and religious propositions as tracking reality the same way they think factual
propositions do.

8.1 Hypotheses
Hypothesis 7A: Participants will report that factual statements are the most obviously
true, followed by political, followed by religious statements.
Hypothesis 7B: Participants will be most certain that a reasonable other person would
agree with them about the truth of factual statements, followed by political, followed by religious
statements.
Hypothesis 7C: Participants will respond that religious statements require the most effort,
commitment, and dedication to believe, followed by political, followed by factual statements.
Hypothesis 7D: Participants will say they have doubted religious beliefs the most,
followed by political, followed by factual.
Hypothesis 7E: A greater percentage of participants will respond that they “believe”
religious statements compared to political statements, and the lowest percentage will respond
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that they “believe” factual statements. The pattern for “knowing” statements are true will be the
reverse.
Hypothesis 7F: Participants will be more angry, mad, offended, guilty, and disgusted by
the prospect of someone saying their religious belief is untrue, followed by political, followed by
factual beliefs. Furthermore, disagreements over factual statements will have almost no
emotional effects whereas those over religious and political disagreements will. Participants will
feel more surprised and confused when someone says a fact is definitely untrue, compared to
when someone says a political or religious statement is untrue.
Hypothesis 7G: Participants will respond that arguments against their religious beliefs are
most predictable and say they make the most logical sense, followed by arguments against
political and then factual beliefs. Participants will rate arguments against their factual beliefs
lower on value and interestingness compared to political and religious counterarguments.
Participants will say they would avoid religious and political counterarguments more than they
would avoid factual counterarguments.

8.2 Method
8.2.1 Participants
160 American participants (101 male) over the age of 18 (mean age 41.34), recruited
from MTurk, participated in the study.

8.2.2 Procedure and Measures
As with the previous studies, participants completed Part 1 and then were presented with
statements that they had rated as at least 85 on the scale of certainly true. In Part 2, along with
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each statement, participants were presented with the following questions in random order.
Participants responded to all questions using a slider depicting words but not numbers, except
question 4 which required them to choose between ‘believe’ and ‘know’.
Question 1: “Sometimes it is very obvious that a statement is true. For example, it is very
obvious that 1+1 = 2. Other times, a statement is true but it is not so obvious. For example, solid
objects are composed of invisible atoms, but it is not so obvious that that is true. Please rate how
obvious it is that the statement above is true. (Please note, we are not asking how true the
statement is, but rather, how obvious it is that the statement is true.)
Question 2: Once we determine some statements are true, we never again consider the
possibility that they might be false. For example, at some point in your life you learned that our
planet is called “Earth” and you probably never wondered whether this was false – you simply
accepted it and never thought about it again. However, for some statements, we determine they
are true but sometimes wonder if they might be false (even though we still think they are true).
For example, you probably learned that many, many years ago, before the beginning of time,
there were no planets, light, or any physical matter at all. Even though you believe this is true,
you might wonder sometimes if it is false. Think about the statement above. How frequently
have you wondered about the possibility that it might be false (even though you still think it is
true)?
Question 3: Imagine another person. This person is a reasonable person who has the same
education level that you have. How certain are you that this person would think that the
statement above is true? (Please note, we are not asking how certain you are that the statement is
true, but rather, how certain you are that the other person would think the statement is true.)
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Question 4: Some statements we believe are true while other statements we know are
true. Please select the option that most accurately describes how you feel about this statement:
a. I believe this statement is true
b. I know this statement is true
Question 5: For some statements, it requires effort, commitment, or dedication to believe
they are true. However, for other statements, it is automatic and effortless to believe they are
true. Think about the statement above. How much effort, dedication, or commitment does it
require to believe the statement above is true?
In Part 1, you indicated that you are highly certain that the statement above is true. Now
please imagine a person who disagrees with you. This person has thought about the statement
above and decided that it is definitely false. Please answer each of the following questions:
Question 6: If you listened to this person talk about why they think this statement is false,
how do you think that would make you feel? [Here participants saw separate sliders, one for each
of the following: angry, sad, mad, happy, disgusted, scared, surprised, confused, offended,
guilty].
Question 7: Imagine this person’s arguments about why you are wrong. Use the sliders
below to indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements:” [Here
participants saw separate sliders, one for each of the following: these arguments would be
valuable for me to hear; these arguments would be predictable; these arguments would be
interesting; these arguments would make logical sense; I would avoid hearing these arguments].
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8.3 Results
In Part 1 of the study, some participants did not indicate that they were highly certain that
any statement was true for at least one domain. It was preferable to have at least one data point
for each participant for each domain, so these participants were excluded from the analyses
leaving a remaining 114 participants (69 males).
Participants could see the same question up to two times per domain (for up to two
statements per domain). For all the questions with sliders, the mean response was calculated for
each question, for each participant, in each domain. To compare across domains, these mean
response values were entered into repeated measures ANOVAs. The independent variable for
each ANOVA was the domain, and the dependent variable was the mean slider response. In
some cases, the difference between political/religious statements was not in the predicted
direction, and/or not significant, but the predicted direction of the factual domain was observed
in nearly all cases (see Table 8).
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Table 8. Questions, mean slider responses, and p values from ANOVA tests – Study 7
p values from comparisons
Question

Political Religious
Mean
Mean
(SE)
(SE)

Factual
Mean
(SE)

F

Political Political
vs.
vs.
Religious Factual

Religious
vs.
Factual

Is the truth obvious?

58.67
(2.36)
59.57
(2.27)
35.72
(2.60)
29.76
(2.24)
30.99
(2.90)
24.23
(2.52)
30.81
(2.94)
4.46
(1.24)
31.29
(3.03)
14.50
(2.21)
31.59
(2.78)
21.61
(2.57)
23.45
(2.77)
3.18
(.87)
51.11
(2.90)
61.79
(2.59)
35.56
(2.25)
37.83
(2.90)
47.65
(2.83)

86.16
(1.94)
86.78
(2.12)
12.16
(2.15)
7.14
(1.69)
15.63
(2.34)
21.03
(2.80)
14.16
(2.20)
6.12
(1.46)
20.12
(2.75)
11.11
(1.94)
63.36
(3.42)
43.48
(3.42)
8.89
(2.01)
2.43
(.89)
22.30
(2.37)
24.92
(2.50)
16.79
(2.04)
43.07
(3.30)
49.18
(3.18)

66.73

1

***

***

53.35

0.118

***

***

83.77

1

***

***

53.36

0.411

***

***

17.33

***

***

1

3.08

0.222

0.94

*

18.13

***

***

1

1.44

0.284

0.76

0.914

17.80

***

**

0.156

1.81

0.337

0.315

1

53.24

0.106

***

***

26.44

0.585

***

***

12

**

***

0.058

2.32

1

0.884

0.139

48.12

***

***

***

76.81

0.162

***

***

25.68

**

***

**

4.65

**

0.372

0.52

7.22

**

1

**

Would another reasonable person believe
this?
How much effort to believe?
How frequently do you doubt?
Listening to a non-believer - Angry?
Listening to a non-believer - Sad?
Listening to a non-believer - Mad?
Listening to a non-believer - Happy
Listening to a non-believer - Disgusted?
Listening to a non-believer - Scared?
Listening to a non-believer - Surprised?
Listening to a non-believer - Confused?
Listening to a non-believer - Offended?
Listening to a non-believer - Guilty?
Counterarguments would be Valuable
Counterarguments would be Predictable
Counterarguments would be Logical
I would avoid counterarguments
Counterarguments would be Interesting

59.73
(3.06)
53.70
(2.53)
35.50
(3.04)
25.57
(2.50)
17.88
(2.57)
30.05
(3.05)
16.19
(2.31)
7.82
(1.92)
14.82
(2.34)
11.21
(2.10)
26.09
(2.81)
18.99
(2.53)
14.84
(2.28)
3.24
(.97)
37.15
(3.10)
68.13
(2.72)
26.50
(2.37)
47.68
(3.06)
36.28
(2.96)

Note. The question column displays a summary of the question or prompt that the participants saw. The
political mean, religious mean, and factual mean columns show the means of the mean slider responses to
each question for each domain. df for all ANOVAS were (2, 112). * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001.
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For the “believe vs. know” question, participants responded more frequently that they
‘know’ factual statements whereas they ‘believe’ political and religious statements (see Fig. 6).
Religious statements included eight “pro-religious” statements and two “anti-religious”
statements. In Figure 6 (but not in the accompanying chi square analyses), the pro-religious
statements are presented separately, showing even more of an effect of domain. A chi-square test
of independence revealed a significant difference between domains (chi square = 69.12, df = 2, p
< .0001). Pairwise comparisons were as follows: Political vs. religious chi square = 2.19, df = 1,
p = .12; political vs. factual chi square = 61.84, df = 1, p < .0001; factual vs. religious chi square
= 44.47, df = 1, p < .0001).

Percentage of Responses

Do you believe or know this statement is true?
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Political

Religious

Pro-Religious Only

Factual

Type of Statement
Believe

Know

Figure 6: Frequencies of “believe” vs. “know” responses

8.4 Study 7 Discussion
Hypotheses 7A-7E were supported. Specifically, participants responded that factual truth
is more obvious than political/religious truth; that factual truth is more reasonable than
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political/religious truth (by saying that a reasonable person would be more likely to believe
factual statements); that religious/political truth requires more effort, commitment, and
dedication to believe than factual truth; that they doubt political/religious truth more often than
they doubt factual truth; and that they mostly “believe” religious/political statements whereas
they mostly “know” factual statements.
Hypothesis 7F was partially supported. Participants typically responded that they would
experience more negative emotions (such as anger, sadness, offense, and disgust) in the face of
political/religious counterarguments. This finding suggests that participants don’t necessarily
find counterarguments to be false, but rather find them to be upsetting because of their political
or religious implications. In addition, participants said they would be more surprised and
confused by factual counterarguments. This finding suggests that participants find factual
counterarguments to be more certainly false and inconsistent with reality. It can be inferred from
this finding that participants think of factual truth as more certainly true and consistent with
reality compared to religious and political truth.
However, no significant difference was observed in reported levels of guilt across
domains when imagining listening to counterarguments. The hypothesis that participants would
feel more guilty if listening to counterarguments in the political and religious domains was based
on the idea that political and religious beliefs signal coalition affiliation. Entertaining
counterarguments in these domains might, therefore, feel like a form of betrayal against one’s
group and cause one to feel guilty. It is possible that participants didn’t interpret the question as
asking about engaging with or considering the validity of counterarguments, which might lead to
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guilt but rather, participants interpreted the question as asking about simply hearing someone
else say a counterargument.
Hypothesis 7G was partially supported. Participants responded that political/religious
counterarguments are more valuable, predictable, and logical than factual counterarguments.
This finding suggests that people are aware of convincing, strong arguments against their
political/religious beliefs but not against their factual beliefs. Some of the observed results were
not predicted. Participants responded that religious counterarguments would be less interesting
than political or factual counterarguments, and that they would avoid factual and religious
counterarguments more than political.
Taken together, the findings from Study 7 strongly support the argument that people
think of religious and political truth differently than they think of factual truth. Religious and
political truth is less obvious, less reasonable, more effortful to believe, more dubious, and less
“known.” Hearing counterarguments against religious/political knowledge is more likely to
cause negative emotions like anger and disgust – a reaction that does not clearly follow if one
believes the counterarguments are clearly false. Conversely, counterarguments against factual
knowledge cause surprise and confusion, which makes sense if one believes that the
counterarguments are clearly false. Furthermore, counterarguments against religious/political
knowledge are reported to be more valuable, predictable, and logical.
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Chapter 9: General Discussion
The current research examined folk epistemology in laypeople, that is, laypeople’s
intuitions and thoughts about their own knowledge. Several principles from academic
epistemology (e.g., verification, falsification, theories of truth, testimony) were examined along
with other concepts surrounding intuitions about knowledge (e.g., certainty, doubt, objectivity,
tolerance of disagreement). In conjunction with this exploration, three domains of knowledge,
political, religious, and factual, were evaluated for hypothesized folk epistemological
differences. This research illuminated intuitive epistemology, showing for the first time how
laypeople think about a variety of epistemological concepts in relation to their own beliefs. In
addition, several hypotheses were supported, demonstrating the unique intuitive epistemological
standards underpinning religious and political belief. Taken together, these findings show that
laypeople think of religious and political truth in a different sense than factual truth. Laypeople
rely less on normative epistemological principles when explaining how and why their political
and religious beliefs are true. If “truth” is taken to mean purely tracking reality, then these
findings suggest that people are less certain about political and religious truth compared to
factual.

9.1 Summary of Purpose and Goals
The overall purpose of the research was to describe how laypeople intuitively think about
various epistemological concepts in relation to their own beliefs. Another goal was to investigate
whether, as hypothesized, laypeople depart from normative epistemology when thinking about
why their religious and political beliefs are true.
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Religious and political knowledge were of interest because (i) folk epistemology in these
domains has been underexplored (ii) beliefs in these domains, unlike in other domains, have
major social consequences, resulting in a unique motivational landscape related to belief, and
(iii) content in these domains often involves clear departures from academic, normative
epistemology and is identified as obviously false by non-believers.
Factual knowledge was of interest because it offered a window into “default” folk
epistemology. That is, intuitions about factual knowledge represent how laypeople think about
straightforward, everyday truth, and thereby offer a comparison against which to understand
individuals’ religious and political folk epistemology.

9.2 Summary of Findings
Study 1 showed that people can reliably categorize propositions as belonging to religious,
political, and factual categories. Participants’ ability to categorize statements consistently into
the intended domains provided the basis for determining which statements best represented the
target domains to most people. Study 2 validated the statements that were to be used in studies 37 and also showed that people find religious and political uncertainty more difficult to resolve
than factual uncertainty. This difference in resolvability of uncertainty was evidence supporting
the argument that political and religious truth is of a different nature than factual truth.
Studies 3-7 examined various epistemological concepts in laypeople, testing the
differences among religious, political, and factual beliefs in each study. Study 3 tested
verification and found a huge difference in how people think about the verifiability of religious,
political, and factual statements. Nearly everyone said they could verify their factual beliefs
whereas less than half reported their religious beliefs to be verifiable. Participants located the
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verifiability of political beliefs between the other two domains. On average, participants
responded that the best way to establish truth involves verification, and the best proof of truth is
evidence in the world. However, religiosity correlated negatively with both valuing verification
and observable evidence as means of establishing truth. Religiosity and political orientation did
not correlate with whether one thought statements were verifiable.
Study 4 tested falsification. Less than a third of participants responded that their religious
beliefs were falsifiable whereas most responded that factual and political beliefs were. On
average, participants were moderately in agreement that falsification is required in order to
determine truth. Religiosity and political orientation didn’t correlate with whether one thought
statements were falsifiable.
Study 5 investigated theories of truth derived from academic epistemology along with
other reasons for one’s belief. On average, participants reported that the coherence theory of
truth was less of a basis for their religious and political beliefs compared to factual. The reverse
pattern was found for the pragmatic theory of truth. Trust in the testimony of others and
indoctrination were found to be more important for acquiring religious and political knowledge
compared to factual. Coherence theory was favored more than any of the other theories of truth
across all three domains of knowledge. Participants seemed to struggle with the meaning of
correspondence theory, rating it the most related to political beliefs but less involved in
determining religious or factual truth.
In Study 6, participants reported that factual truth was the most objective, political truth
the most subjective, and religious truth the most nihilistic (i.e., it was impossible to say whether
religious truth was subjective or objective). People reported feeling negative emotions when
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reflecting on religious and political counterarguments whereas they reported feelings of surprise
and confusion in the face of factual counterarguments.
Study 7 examined a variety of concepts surrounding intuitions about knowledge. On
average, participants responded that factual truth is more obvious, more reasonable, more
effortless to believe, less dubious, and more “known” than religious and political truth.

9.3 Implications
At the most basic level, these findings reveal much about folk epistemology that was
previously unknown. Principles from academic epistemology were investigated for the first time
in laypeople along with a variety of intuitive concepts (like frequency of doubt, reasonableness
of truth, and judgements of counterarguments). Overall, the approach taken here illuminated
many features of belief that have been unstudied.
The deeper connection to previous research however, lies in the folk epistemological
domain differences identified. Throughout the history of the study of folk epistemology,
questions about domain generality versus specificity have persisted. Some scholars have found
evidence for domain-general trends (Schommer & Walker, 1995; Schommer-Aikins et al., 2003),
but many others have increasingly demonstrated domain specificity in folk epistemology (Muis
et al., 2006). That is, intuitive perspectives about knowledge along a variety of dimensions have
been found to differ according to the type of knowledge.
The current research is the first systematic investigation of the folk epistemology of
ideological beliefs (religious and political). These domains have largely been ignored by those
studying folk epistemology despite their compelling and extreme domain differences. Much of
the previous work on domain specificity of folk epistemology has been motivated by an interest
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in learning, education, and development. Thus, “domain” has often been taken to mean academic
discipline, like psychology, hard sciences, or history (Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000).
Amidst the debate about domain differences, the framework depicted in Table 1 (Kuhn et
al., 2000) emerged as a relatively popular unification of theories and findings. On the domaingeneral side, a reliable shift from absolutist through multiplist, and then finally to evaluativist
seems to occur across at least several domains studied. On the domain-specific side, however,
the rate at which this developmental trajectory occurs, varies according to the specific domain of
knowledge.
But does this framework suffice for the religious and political domains? Although the
present research did not investigate developmental stages, the current findings suggest that lay
perspectives about religious and political beliefs do not fit into the Kuhn et al. (2000) framework.
According to Kuhn et al., adults reach the evaluativist stage, characterized by an appreciation for
well-reasoned arguments and evidence. Critical thinking is valued as a means for achieving
understanding.
Adults’ responses to the epistemological questions with respect to factual statements,
indeed, were consistent with the evaluativist perspective. On average, participants indicated that
they relied on verification, observable evidence in the world, and logical coherence for factual
statements. If the evaluativist stage were truly domain general, that is, if the characteristic
perspectives towards knowledge occurred for all types of knowledge, then participants would
have responded to the religious and political statements similarly to how they responded to
factual statements. Responses regarding religious and political knowledge, however, bore no
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resemblance to evaluativism. Religious and political beliefs were said to be true with less or little
reliance on reason or evidence.
In order to compare the evaluativist perspective to the intuitions underlying religious and
political beliefs, consider the religious proposition, “Jesus walked on water without sinking.” For
someone who rated the proposition as ‘very certainly true,’ the findings of the current research
show that this person could simultaneously value verification and falsification yet find this
proposition to be unverifiable and unfalsifiable. She could sometimes doubt whether this
proposition were true. She would describe her commitment to the truth of this proposition as
“believing” as opposed to “knowing.” She could say it requires effort to believe this statement,
that its truth is not obvious, and that it is unreasonable to believe. She would think belief in this
statement would be unlikely if she had learned about it after age of 25. If someone else argued
against believing this proposition were true, then she would feel upset emotionally but not
confused or surprised. In fact, she would find the counterarguments valuable, predictable, and
logical. Finally, she would find it impossible to say who was right or wrong about the
disagreement.
Such a pattern of folk epistemology cannot be described as “evaluativist” and isn’t
accurately described by other previous theories. Moreover, the “multiplist” or “absolutist” labels
do not fit well either. Participants didn’t think of their religious and political beliefs as
objectively true nor exactly as opinions. The findings, taken together, paint a picture of religious
and political folk epistemology that challenges previously accepted definitions of truth,
knowledge, or belief. These results suggest that commitment to the truth value of a proposition in
the religious and political domains does not depend on academic/normative epistemology nor on
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standard folk epistemology. It may not even depend exclusively on the content of the
proposition.
The findings of the current research suggest that people are less certain that political and
religious statements are “true” in the sense that they represent or describe reality. If this is the
case, then political and religious beliefs are the most striking cases of domain specificity in folk
epistemology ever studied.

9.4 Caveats and Directions for Future Research
Participants appeared to interpret some questions, or components of questions, in
unintended ways. As a consequence, a few of the results are unclear or show no difference
between domains. Taken as a whole, however, the body of findings represents a consistent
convergence. Nonetheless, these presumably misinterpreted questions could be improved. For
instance, participants’ understanding of falsification and correspondence theory could have been
better established as part of investigating laypeople’s intuitions regarding these concepts.
Participants identified political beliefs as falsifiable more frequently than they did factual
beliefs. It is impossible to know exactly why this result was found but the explanation that
participants could not imagine falsifying factual statements like “Maine is north of Florida,”
seems likely. Similarly, participants responded that correspondence theory was more the basis
for political truth than it was for factual truth. The possible explanation raised for this result was
that participants focused on the terminology in the question which asked about “events in the
world,” and may have sounded too political.
If these interpretations are correct, then they would constitute a misunderstanding of
falsification and correspondence theory by participants. But it is worth noting that even if these
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concepts were misunderstood, something can be learned from the results. If applying falsification
to everyday factual knowledge sounds simply impossible, and if the idea of statements
corresponding to states of the world is confusing to laypeople, then it could be the case that these
principles are not major components of folk epistemology. This conclusion cannot be made from
the current results, but the possibility that laypeople rarely, if ever, think about falsification or
correspondence could be better investigated in future research.
It is possible that asking laypeople to imagine listening to counterarguments against their
religious and political beliefs failed to evoke the intended emotional response. For some of the
questions regarding reactions to counterarguments, the predictions were unconfirmed. In future
research, an alternative manipulation that evoked more emotion could be explored to better test
the hypotheses about reactions to challenges to one’s beliefs in different domains.
The current research reveals a lot about what political and religious beliefs are not – they
are not considered to be certainly true factual knowledge that describes reality. But this then
raises the question as to what they are. What is their function? How are they acquired and
maintained? Given that they don’t exclusively track reality, to what extent does the content of
religious and political propositions motivate behavior (e.g., if one “believes” that he will go to
heaven then is he willing to take suicidal risks)? It remains to be determined whether the
characteristics of the evaluativist stage are absent in the religious and political domains or if they
are present but fail to determine beliefs due to other influences. In other words, do believers have
access to a critical analysis of their religious and political beliefs, including potentially damning
counterarguments, but nevertheless maintain these beliefs because of other motivations? These
are questions that now remain for future research. A fuller understanding of religious and
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political beliefs may contribute to advances in conflict resolution and to more successful
approaches to persuasion. Finally, this understanding can serve as a window into our social
nature, illuminating the bonding and group affiliation signaling that these beliefs are likely to
facilitate.
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Appendix 1: List of Statements Used in Study 1
Statement
Number

Intended
Domain

Statement

1

Political

2

Political

A powerful military is
necessary to protect
American interests
Affirmative action leads to
unqualified individuals
holding important jobs

3

Political

4

Political

5

Political

6

Political

7

Political

8

Political

9

Political

10

Political

11

Political

12

Political

Categorized
as Intended
by
88%

81%

All Israel wants is to live in
peace and Palestine is
preventing that from
happening.
Allowing airport security to
profile passengers
maximizes safety.

80%

Allowing the NSA to
monitor cell phone
conversations helps fight
terrorism
Global warming is caused
by human pollution

72%

Green energy (like wind
and solar power) is a
realistic alternative
Heavily taxing large
corporations causes the
overall economy to suffer

35%

Labor unions are essential
for protecting workers'
rights
Legalizing marijuana is
overall more costly to
society
Maintaining a high prison
population is an effective
way of deterring crime

70%

Minimum wage is enough
to support an individual

63%
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55%

36%

88%

78%

69%

Opposite Statement

A powerful military is
not necessary to protect
American interests
Affirmative action does
not lead to unqualified
individuals holding
important jobs
All Palestine wants is to
live in peace and Israel is
preventing that from
happening.
Allowing airport security
to profile passengers
does not maximize
safety.
Allowing the NSA to
monitor cell phone
conversations does not
help fight terrorism
Global warming is not
caused by human
pollution
Green energy (like wind
and solar power) is not a
realistic alternative.
Heavily taxing large
corporations does not
cause the overall
economy to suffer
Labor unions are not
essential for protecting
workers' rights
Legalizing marijuana is
overall less costly to
society
Maintaining a high
prison population is not
an effective way of
deterring crime.
Minimum wage is too
low to support an
individual

Categorized
as Intended
by
87%

69%

77%

51%

81%

39%

41%

82%

75%

70%

56%

49%

13

Political

Most people on welfare are
abusing the system rather
than looking for work

70%

14

Political

89%

15

Political

16

Political

17

Political

Offering a path to
citizenship to illegal
immigrants will cause more
people to illegally enter the
USA
Police in the USA often use
lethal force against unarmed
black males because of
racism
Providing condoms in
public schools is an
effective way to reduce
STDs and pregnancy
Public funding for stem cell
research will lead to
extremely valuable medical
knowledge

18

Political

Regulations on businesses
are necessary to prevent
mass extinction of species
in the wild

55%

19

Political

School vouchers incentivize
poorly performing public
schools to improve

71%

20

Political

Securing the Mexican
border will strengthen the
American job market

85%

21

Political

Spending more tax dollars
on the worst performing
public schools is a waste

84%

22

Political

70%

23

Political

The death penalty deters
crime
The military is weaker if it
allows open homosexuality.

24

Political

59%

28%

52%

75%

The population of a country, 86%
on average, receives inferior
healthcare when the
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Most people on welfare
are looking for work
rather than abusing the
system
Offering a path to
citizenship to illegal
immigrants will not
cause more people to
illegally enter the USA
Police in the USA rarely
use lethal force against
unarmed black males
because of racism
Providing condoms in
public schools is not an
effective way to reduce
STDs and pregnancy
Public funding for stem
cell research will not
lead to extremely
valuable medical
knowledge
Regulations on
businesses are not
necessary to prevent
mass extinction of
species in the wild
School vouchers do not
incentivize poorly
performing public
schools to improve
Securing the Mexican
border will not
strengthen the American
job market
Spending more tax
dollars on the worst
performing public
schools is not a waste
The death penalty does
not deter crime
The military is not
weaker if it allows open
homosexuality
The population of a
country, on average,
receives superior
healthcare when the

61%

85%

67%

47%

53%

70%

63%

86%

83%

66%
72%

73%

25

Political

26

Political

27

Political

28

Political

29

Political

30

Political

31

Factual

32

Factual

33

Factual

34

Factual

35
36

Factual
Factual

37

Factual

38

Factual

39

Factual

40

Factual

41

Factual

42
43
44

healthcare system is run by
the government.
The right to own guns
makes society less safe
The war on drugs is a
failure
Torturing suspected
terrorists helps keep the
country safe
Universities nationwide
have a lax response to
sexual assault on their
campuses.

69%
61%
82%

33%

War against Iran is probably
necessary to protect national
security
Women are paid less than
men due to sexism
A square has four right
angles
Airplanes are safe to
operate underwater
Alcohol consumption
impairs driving ability in
most people
Barak Obama's birthday is
August 2nd
Birds can fly
Bucharest is the capital of
Romania
Cellular phones cause HIV

90%

Coca-Cola is a brand of
soda
Corn grows well on the
moon
Dinosaurs live today in the
Florida swamps

98%

85%

Factual

Earth's atmosphere is
mostly oxygen
George Clooney is a man

Factual
Factual

germs are very small
Gold is heavier than silver

95%
77%
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49%
98%
57%
92%

78%
100%
94%
49%

56%
54%

96%

healthcare system is run
by the government.
The right to own guns
makes society safer
The war on drugs is not
a failure
Torturing suspected
terrorists does not help
keep the country safe
Universities nationwide
do not have a lax
response to sexual
assault on their
campuses.
War against Iran is
probably unnecessary to
protect national security
Women are not paid less
than men due to sexism
A square does not have
four right angles
Airplanes are unsafe to
operate underwater
Alcohol consumption
improves driving ability
in most people.
Barak Obama's birthday
is not August 2nd
Birds can't fly
Bucharest is not the
capital of Romania
Cellular phones do not
cause HIV
Coca-Cola is not a brand
of soda
Corn does not grow well
on the moon
Dinosaurs do not live
today in the Florida
swamps
Earth's atmosphere is not
mostly oxygen
George Clooney is a
woman
germs are very large
Gold is lighter than
silver

81%
82%
68%

45%

92%

52%
63%
91%
64%

74%
56%
79%
90%
64%
89%
93%

91%
53%
59%
72%

45

Factual

Limes are an excellent
source of vitamin C
Maine is north of Florida
Most crimes are committed
by people over 80 years old

87%

46
47

Factual
Factual

48

Factual

Nigeria has a smaller
population than Japan
On average, the north pole
is colder than the equator

82%

49

Factual

50

Factual

Regular exercise usually
helps people lose weight
Tables are often made of
wood.
The 10 tallest buildings in
the world are made entirely
of tissue paper

90%

51

Factual

52

Factual

53

Factual

The first postage stamp was
issued in 1748
The invention of the
internet made sending and
receiving information easier

85%

54

Factual

55

Factual

The strength of gravity
changes according to which
day of the week it is

74%

56

Factual

Tom Cruise exists

93%

57
58

Factual
Factual

62%
98%

59

Factual

60

Factual

Trees have brains
Tylenol relieves fever and
headache
Ultraviolet light is visible to
humans
US dollars are the official
currency of every country in
the world

61

Religious After death, there is
71%
nothing. You simply die and
that's it
Religious After people die their soul
95%
goes to heaven or hell
Religious Angels exist
91%

62
63
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92%
43%

94%

90%
56%

88%

69%
49%

Limes are a poor source
of vitamin C
Maine is south of Florida
Most crimes are
committed by people
under 80 years old
Nigeria has a larger
population than Japan
On average, the north
pole is warmer than the
equator
Regular exercise rarely
helps people lose weight
Tables are rarely made
of wood.
The 10 tallest buildings
in the world are not
made entirely of tissue
paper
The first postage stamp
was not issued in 1748
The invention of the
internet made sending
and receiving
information more
difficult
The strength of gravity
does not change
according to which day
of the week it is
Tom Cruise does not
exist
Trees do not have brains
Tylenol does not relieve
fever and headache
Ultraviolet light is not
visible to humans
US dollars are not the
official currency of
every country in the
world
After death, there is
something. You don't
simply die and that's it
After people die nothing
else happens.
Angels do not exist

76%
67%
73%

87%
67%

67%
58%
88%

76%
55%

91%

54%
85%
66%
91%
68%

84%

76%
81%

64

Religious Angels visit people in
dreams
Religious God can be in multiple
locations at the same time.

89%

Religious God can hear people's
thoughts
Religious God exists

96%

Religious God wrote the 10
commandments on stones
for Moses
Religious Jesus' mother, Mary, was a
virgin when she gave birth
to Jesus
Religious Jesus rose from the dead

93%

71

Religious Jesus walked on water
without sinking

94%

72

Religious Jesus was more just a
person and had supernatural
powers
Religious Noah put all animal species
onto an ark to save them
from a flood

93%

Religious Prayer can alter what
happens in the future
Religious Satan can cause evil events
to occur by using
supernatural powers
Religious Satan is real

96%

Religious Sometimes miracles cause
people to recover from
illness
Religious The bible is perfect and
doesn't have contradictions
and errors
Religious The first humans were
created in the garden of
Eden
Religious There is a preexisting plan
for each individual's life.

86%

65

66
67

68

69

70

73

74
75

76
77

78

79

80

Angels do not visit
people in dreams
God cannot be in
multiple locations at the
same time.
God cannot hear people's
thoughts
God did not write the 10
commandments on
stones for Moses
God does not exist

78%

96%

Jesus did not rise from
the dead

86%

99%

Jesus did not walk on
water without sinking
Jesus' mother, Mary, was
not a virgin when she
gave birth to Jesus
Jesus was just a person
with no supernatural
powers
Noah did not put all
animal species onto an
ark to save them from a
flood
Prayer has no effect on
the future
Satan cannot cause evil
events to occur by using
supernatural powers
Satan was made up to
scare people
Miracles never cause
people to recover from
illness
The bible is far from
perfect and full of
contradictions and errors
The first humans were
not created in the garden
of Eden
There is no preexisting
plan for each individual's
life

90%

96%

93%
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89%

92%

95%

88%

91%

88%

86%

90%
89%

81%

86%

84%

84%

89%
91%

77%
76%

85%

67%

71%

81

Religious There will be a second
coming of Jesus Christ.

97%

82

Religious When people consume
bread and wine at
communion, it turns into
flesh and blood inside them

77%

83

Other

66%

There will never be a
second coming of Jesus
Christ.
When people consume
bread and wine at
communion, it does not
turn into flesh and blood
inside them
No opposite presented

84

Other

58%

No opposite presented

85

Other

64%

No opposite presented

86

Other

71%

No opposite presented

87

Other

63%

No opposite presented

88

Other

55%

No opposite presented

89

Other

60%

No opposite presented

90

Other

63%

No opposite presented

91
92
93

Other
Other
Other

65%
31%
70%

No opposite presented
No opposite presented
No opposite presented

Frank Sinatra is better than
Lady Gaga
Secrets are more morally
correct than lies
The ethical thing to do is
make ceilings lower
Shorts look better than
pants.
The sewing machine is a
more impressive invention
than the printing press
Einstein was smarter than
Isaac Newton
72 is a more comfortable
temperature than 71
Losing one big toe would be
worse than losing both
middle fingers
It's ok to be a hypocrite
A hot dog is not a sandwich
Chocolate is better than
vanilla
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86%

64%

Appendix 2: List of statements used in Study 2.
Domain

Statement

PS1
PS2

War against Iran is probably unnecessary to protect national security. (R)
Offering a path to citizenship to illegal immigrants will cause more people to illegally
enter the USA.
PS3
A powerful military is necessary to protect American interests.
PS4
Securing the Mexican border will not strengthen the American job market. (R)
PS5
The population of a country, on average, receives inferior healthcare when the
healthcare system is run by the government.
PS6
Spending more tax dollars on the worst performing public schools is a waste.
PS7
The war on drugs is not a failure.
PS8
Torturing suspected terrorists helps keep the country safe.
PS9
The right to own guns makes society safer.
PS10
Affirmative action leads to unqualified individuals holding important jobs.
RS1
Jesus' mother, Mary, was a virgin when she gave birth to Jesus.
RS2
Prayer can alter what happens in the future.
RS3
After people die their soul goes to heaven or hell.
RS4
Satan is real.
RS5
Jesus walked on water without sinking.
RS6
God exists.
RS7
The first humans were created in the Garden of Eden.
RS8
Noah put all animal species onto an ark to save them from a flood.
RS9
Jesus did not rise from the dead. (R)
FS1
Tom Cruise exists.
FS2
Dinosaurs do not live today in the Florida swamps.
FS3
Bucharest is the capital of Romania.
FS4
Earth's atmosphere is not mostly oxygen.
FS5
Ultraviolet light is not visible to humans.
FS6
Nigeria has a larger population than Japan.
FS7
The first postage stamp was issued in 1748.
FS8
Barak Obama's birthday is August 2nd.
FS9
Gold is heavier than silver.
FS10
Cellular phones do not cause HIV.
Note. P, R, and F represent Political, Religious, and Factual. There was an error with the 10th religious
statement so it is not shown in Appendix 2, and questions about that statement were excluded
from the analyses.
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Appendix 3: List of Statements Used in Studies 3-7
Domain

Statement

Political The military is weaker if it allows open homosexuality.
Political Most people on welfare are abusing the system rather than looking for work.
Political A powerful military is necessary to protect American interests.
Political Affirmative action leads to unqualified individuals holding important jobs.
Political The population of a country, on average, receives inferior healthcare when the healthcare
system is run by the government.
Political Labor unions are essential for protecting workers' rights.
Political Securing the Mexican border will strengthen the American job market.
Political All Palestine wants is to live in peace and Israel is preventing that from happening
Political Torturing suspected terrorists does not help keep the country safe.
Political The right to own guns makes society safer.
Religious When people consume bread and wine at communion, it turns into flesh and blood inside
them.
Religious Jesus' mother, Mary, was a virgin when she gave birth to Jesus.
Religious The first humans were created in the Garden of Eden.
Religious The Bible is far from perfect and full of contradictions and errors.
Religious After someone dies their soul goes to heaven or hell.
Religious Satan is real.
Religious Jesus walked on water without sinking.
Religious God exists.
Religious Noah put all animal species onto an ark to save them from a flood.
Religious Jesus did not rise from the dead.
Factual

Cellular phones do not cause HIV.

Factual

Tom Cruise exists.

Factual

Coca-Cola is a brand of soda.

Factual

Maine is north of Florida.

Factual

Airplanes are unsafe to operate underwater.

Factual

Ultraviolet light is visible to humans.

Factual

Germs are very small.

Factual

Limes are a poor source of vitamin C.
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Factual

Barack Obama's birthday is August 2nd.

Factual

Gold is heavier than silver.
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Appendix 4: New Indices of Religious Orientation (NIRO)
Participants respond on a Likert scale from 0-4 (agree strongly, agree, not certain,
disagree, and disagree strongly) for each of the 27 items. There are no reverse-scored items. The
scale provides three scores: extrinsic orientation, intrinsic orientation, and quest, which are each
the sum of the 9 responses in their respective sections.
New Indices of Religious Orientation (NIRO)
Extrinsic orientation
Compartmentalization
1) While I believe in my religion, there are more important things in my life.
2) While I am a religious person, I do not let religion influence my daily life.
3) Occasionally, I compromise my religious beliefs to protect my social and economic wellbeing.
Social support
4) One reason for me going to church is that it helps to establish me in the community.
5) A key reason for my interest in church is that it is a pleasant social activity.
6) I go to church because it helps me to feel at home in my neighborhood.
Personal support
7) One reason for me praying is that it helps me to gain relief and protection.
8) What prayer offers me most is comfort when sorrow or misfortune strike.
9) I pray chiefly because it makes me feel better.
Intrinsic orientation
Integration
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10) My religious beliefs really shape my whole approach to life.
11) I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.
12) My religious beliefs really shape the way I treat other people.
13) Public religion I allow almost nothing to prevent me from going to church on Sundays.
14) I go to church because it helps me to feel close to God.
15) The church is most important to me as a place to share fellowship with other Christians.
Personal religion
16) I pray at home because it helps me to be aware of God’s presence.
17) I often read books about prayer and the spiritual life.
18) I pray chiefly because it deepens my relationship with God.
Quest orientation
Existentialism
19) I was driven to ask religious questions by a growing awareness of the tensions in my world.
20) My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious beliefs.
21) Religion only became very important for me when I began to ask questions about the
meaning of my life.
Self-criticism
22) I value my religious doubts and uncertainties.
23) For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious.
24) Questions are more important to my religious faith than are answers.
Openness to change
25) As I grow and change, I expect my religion to grow and change as well.
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26) I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs.
27) There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing.
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Appendix 5: Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA)
Participants respond on 9-point Likert scale from very strongly disagree (-4) to very
strongly agree (4) for each item. The scale has an equal number of pro- and anti-authoritarian
statements. The first two items are not included in the overall score and are considered practice.
Statements 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, and 22 are scored by simply adding 5 to the
participant’s response. For example, a response of -4 would be scored a 1. The remaining
statements are reverse-scored (a response of -4 is scored as a 9, for example). The lowest
possible score is a 20 and the highest is a 180.
Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA)
1) The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals
and protestors are usually just “loud mouths” showing off their ignorance.
2) Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married.
3) Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to
destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.
4) Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.
5) It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and
religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create
doubt in people’s minds.
6) Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every
bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.
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7) The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional
values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad
ideas.
8) There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.
9) Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if
this upsets many people.
10) Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at
our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.
11) Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even
if it makes them different from everyone else.
12) The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live.
13) You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by protesting
for women’s abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer.
14) What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take
us back to our true path.
15) Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government,
criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way things are supposed to be done.”
16) God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before it
is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.
17) There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for
their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.
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18) A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are
submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.
19) Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities
tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything.
20) There is no “one right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way.
21) Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy “traditional
family values.”
22) This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just shut
up and accept their group’s traditional place in society.
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Appendix 6: Demographic Questionnaire
Please enter your age in years.

Gender:
 Female
 Male
 Prefer not to answer

Which of the following best describes your highest level of education?
 Less than high school graduate
 High school graduate
 Attended some college
 College graduate
 Graduate school
 Prefer not to answer

What was your household income last year before taxes?
 Less than $25,000
 $25,000 - 34,999
 $35,000 - 49,999
 $50,000 - 74,999
 $75,000 - 99,999
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 $100,000 or more
 Prefer not to answer

Please indicate your ethnicity:
 Hispanic or Latino
 Not of Hispanic/Latino Origin
 Prefer not to answer

Please indicate your race:
 American Indian/Alaska Native
 Asian
 Black/African American
 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
 White
 More than one race
 Other
 Prefer not to answer

Which of the following best represents your religious affiliation?
 Roman Catholic
 Protestant/other non-denominational Christian
 Jewish
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 Muslim
 Mormon
 Atheist/realist/humanist
 No affiliation
 Other
 Prefer not to answer

What political party do you most identify with?
 Democrat
 Republican
 Independent
 Constitution Party
 Green Party of the United States
 Libertarian Party
 Other
 Prefer not to answer

Which description best represents your political ideology?
 Progressive/very liberal
 Liberal
 Moderate
 Conservative
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 Very conservative
 Libertarian
 Not sure
 Prefer not to answer

Please indicate the geographic region in which you live:
 Northeast (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey)
 Midwest (Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Missouri, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa)
 South (Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Oklahoma,
Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana)
 West (Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, Alaska,
Washington, Oregon, California, Hawaii)
 Other ____________________
 Prefer not to answer

Which of the following best represents where you live?
 Large city (100,000 or more residents)
 Small city (less than 100,000 residents)
 Suburbs
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 Rural area
 Prefer not to answer

Please enter your MTurk Worker ID in the text box below.

If you have any general comments about this study enter them here. Let us know if you had any
difficulty or problems completing the study.
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